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Local-level Institutions and Common Property Resource Management 
Plate 1: A situation of open access exists due to lack of control on use of the natural 
resources, thereby putting pressure on the scarce resources 
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ABSTRACT 
Local-level institutions under the 'right' conditions and given an enabling environment, 
can be some of the appropriate and effective institutions for management of certain 
resources. The ' common property regimes' under certain conditions can also act as 
powerful catalysts for effective functioning local-level management institutions. Different 
countries have therefore formulated policies that would enable local-level institutions to 
participate in management of natural resources. However, policy changes that introduce 
new local-level management institutions have either been ineffective, or there have not 
been adequate mechanisms and appropriate institutional arrangements to support 
implementation of policies at the local level. The socio-cultural, political, economic and 
legislative conditions that are necessary for the effective functioning local-level 
institutions and ' common property regimes ' at the local level are often lacking or 
inappropriate. Moreover, attributes of achieving sustainable management of the resource 
are often not taken cognisance of in the implementation of policies. As a result, local-level 
institutions have often failed to meet the desired policy objectives and therefore have been 
ineffective. 
In 1993, the Government of Namibia formulated the Rural Water Supply Policy which 
provides for the establishment of the Water Point Committees to take responsibility for 
management of water supply in rural areas. By establishing these local-level water 
management institutions, policy makers in Namibia assume that water resources in the 
rural areas will be managed sustainably. This dissertation seeks to evaluate the 
effectiveness of local-level institutions in the management of rural water supply in 
Namibia. Water Point Committees in the Khorixas regional constituency will be used as 
an illustration. Specifically, this dissertation examines the provisions of the Rural Water 
Supply Policy and the National Land Policy and assesses their implications with regards to 
management of land and water in communal areas. In addition, the socio-economic 
conditions of the Khorixas constituency and their appropriateness for local-level 
management are examined. The extent to which the attributes of sustainability have been 
considered in the implementation of policies is also examined. Broad recommendations 
that could improve the effectiveness of the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas 
constituency and possibly in other areas in Namibia are made. 
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·~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Methods used to provide information necessary for this study included: extensive .literature 
reviews; field work in Namibia as well as interviews with government ministries; non-
governmental organisations; private agencies; academic institutions; traditional leaders and 
other key stakeholders in Namibia. Discussions were also held with members of the 
community in the Khorixas constituency to obtain their views on the role and functions of 
the Water Point Committees and assess their understanding of the principles of the Rural 
Water Supply Policy and the National Land Policy. 
The lack of security of tenure of land and water for local communities and the lack of 
appropriate measures to support effective functioning Water Point Committees will be a 
major impediment to sustainable management of water resources in the Khorixas 
constituency. Moreover, new·policy changes that are introduced without taking cognisance 
of the social organisation of local communities will likely hamper the effectiveness of the 
Water Point Committees. Sustainable management of water resources could be unlikely if 
mechanisms are not in place at the local level to ensure that implementation of policies 
takes cognisance of the principles or attributes of sustainability. This dissertation argues 
that effective Water Point Committees in the Khorixas constituency and possibly in other 
areas in Namibia will therefore emerge provided: 







there are new partnership arrangements between the Water Point Committees and the 
state, with the state providing a more enabling legislative framework and incentives for 
water management; 
traditional institutions are recognised and are fully involved in the decision making 
process, and indigenous management systems are utilised where possible; 
the capacity of all institutions involved in the management of water supply is enhanced; 
communities in the Khorixas constituency are well defined; and, 
principles of sustainability are considered in the implementation of all rural water 
provision programmes. 
Thus, a variety of measures need to be put in place to ensure that policies supporting local-
level management are translated into practical and sustainable actions. 
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the National Land Policy provides security of tenure of land and water for local 
communities; 
there are new partnership arrangements between the Water Point Committees and the 
state, with the state providing a more enabling legislative framework and incentives for 
water management; 
traditional institutions are recognised and are fully involved in the decision making 
process, and indigenous management systems are utilised where possible; 
the capacity of all institutions involved in the management of water supply is enhanced; 
communities in the Khorixas constituency are well defined; and, 
principles of sustainability are considered in the implementation of all rural water 
prov1s1on programmes. 
Thus, a variety of measures need to be put in place to ensure that policies supporting local-
level management are translated into practical and sustainable actions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Since the 1970's, there have been increasing attempts by policy makers in developed and 
developing countries to devolve authority for management of natural resources to local-
level institutions or user groups (Lawry, 1990). The growing interest from policy makers 
in management of natural resources by local-level institutions and local communities stems 
from the recognition that local-level institutions and local communities, through their 
traditional management systems have managed to use their resources sustainably over 
generations, which accounts for the existence of these resources today (Berkes and Farvar, 
1989). Moreover, local communities and their institutions understand the local conditions 
and the problems relating to their local resources better than any other institutions. Due to 
their closeness to the resources and the practical knowledge they have accumulated in 
managing these resources, they are therefore capable, and can play a valuable role as 
'guardians ' of their natural resources (Hangula, 1995). 
However, interest and attempts to involve local-level institutions have not always been 
accompanied by effective policies that would enable sustainable management of these 
resources, particularly where the resources are used communally (Cleaver, 1994). In some 
cases, there are neither adequate mechanisms to implement policies nor appropriate 
institutional arrangements to support local-level management of resources (Lawry, 1990; 
Western and Wright, 1993). In sub-Saharan Africa, where most of the resources such as 
grazing land, forests , water, wildlife and others are used in common, poor management has 
often been attributed to inadequate mechanisms for implementing policies at the local level 
and failure to establish appropriate institutional arrangements for local-level management. 
For example, incentives for individuals to participate in local management activities are 
weak, local institutions lack the capacity to fulfil their responsibilities and are unable to 
apply sanctions to enforce the rules (Lawry, 1990; Critchley and Turner, 1996). 
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Namibia has recognised the need to formulate new policies aimed at sustainable utilisation 
of its natural resources (National Planning Commission, 1995). Since the independence of 
Namibia from the Republic of South Africa in 1990, the Government of Namibia through 
its conservation authorities has developed new approaches for management of natural 
resources. These approaches put emphasis on sustainable utilisation of resources such as 
wildlife by devolving control and management to local people and locally-based 
organisations in the communal areas (Jones, 1996). However, one of the most critical 
problems that pertains to these communal areas, is lack of provision for security of land 
tenure in the National Land Policy. In the absence of secure land tenure in communal 
areas, there will be no incentive for communities to sustainably manage these common 
resources (Corbett and Daniels, 1996; Dewdney, 1996). 
Without secure tenure, local communities will only consider their short-term interests and 
will exploit the resources for maximum immediate gain, regardless of future consequences 
for the resource base (Western and Wright, 1993). In the <;:ontext of this dissertation, water 
supply in the Khorixas regional constituency in Namibia is a good example where 
resources are communally used and management is in the hands of local institutions, and 
yet communities do not have secure tenure of the natural resources, in particular land and 
water. Lack of security of tenure is therefore one of the key obstacles to sustainable 
management of water resources by local communities and their local-level institutions. 
Furthermore, although relevant policies have been formulated, there are no adequate 
mechanisms for implementation of these policies at the local level. Thus, the effectiveness 
of local-level institutions is hampered. 
In January 1997, the Directorate of Environment and Tourism, on behalf of the Namibian 
Programme to Combat Desertification (NAPCOD) contracted the team of eight Masters 
students enrolled in the Department of Environmental and Geographical Science at the 
University of Cape Town to undertake a retrospective assessment of environmental impacts 
of borehole supply in Namibia. Two case studies (Khorixas regional constituency and 
Garn resettlement area) were selected by the study team in consultation with some 
representatives from NAPCOD. In Khorixas, most of the boreholes were sunk under the 
1992/93 Drought Relief Programme, while in Garn borehole supply provision was a 
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component of the Herero Resettlement Programme in 1993. The case study areas lie 
approximately on the same latitude across Namibia's East-West rainfall gradient. For this 
reason, the study team together with the representatives from NAPCOD thought that these 
areas would form a useful comparison as they represented two different climatic 
environments in Namibia. 
The need for undertaking an environmental assessment of the boreholes was a result of 
concerns raised by several government and non-governmental institutions in Namibia, that 
there is insufficient knowledge regarding the impact of boreholes on the environment. This 
lack of knowledge results in inadequate assessment of environmental impacts in the 
planning process of borehole provision. Members of NAPCOD therefore felt there was a 
need to establish a scientific basis from which the planning process for boreholes may be 
informed. Funding for the study was provided by Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). 
The case studies focused on the environmental implications of borehole supply in the 
Khorixas regional constituency and the Garn resettlement area during the 1992/93 Drought 
Relief Programme and any other boreholes that were not necessarily provided as part of the 
Relief Programme. One of the key findings by the study team was that security of tenure of 
natural resources in communal areas such as the Khorixas constituency, was one of the 
critical issues that hamper efforts for sustainable management of natural resources by local 
communities and their locally-based institutions. This dissertation also recognises that 
there are other factors which need to be taken cognisance of in the management of water 
supply in communal areas in Namibia. These include the organisation and stability of 
communities, capacity of institutions involved in local-level management, supporting 
legislative framework, recognition of traditional institutions and utilisation of indigenous 
management systems, defining the communities and environmental sustainability of water 
provision programmes. 
During the investigation, individual students focused on different aspects of borehole 
provision in Namibia at national, regional and community levels. Issues investigated 
included: institutional structures involved in borehole siting; policies and decision making; 
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land tenure and community ownership; socio-economic and biophysical environmental 
issues and monitoring of boreholes. Information compiled by all the students was analysed 
and a Baseline Report was prepared. 
This dissertation, while drawing on the information in the Baseline Report provides an 
analysis of conditions (socio-economic, political and cultural) under which the 'common 
property regimes' and local-level management of resources are likely to succeed. An in-
depth analysis of common property management as well as the implications of different 
'resource regimes' for local-level resource management is undertaken. Factors which 
facilitate effective local-level management of natural resources are examined with the view 
to as~essing whether conditions in the Khorixas regional constituency lend themselves to 
effective local-level management. 
The dissertation attempts to highlight that local-level institutions, under the 'right ' 
circumstances and given an enabling environment, can be effective structures for common 
property resource management. It is highlighted in this dissertation that the ' common 
property regimes ' can act as powerful catalysts for development of local-level institutions 
and community participation in resource management. The success of the ' common 
property regimes ' and local-level institutions in local management is however dependent 
on other factors such as social stability of communities, genuine devolution of decision 
making powers to resource users, clearly defined rules and regulations on the use of the 
resource, assessment of benefits to be derived from resource management and other factors 
which are outlined in detail in Chapters 2. and 3. This dissertation analyses the 
effectiveness of the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas regional constituency in 
Namibia as an illustration. Recommendations are made on policy and institutional issues 
that need to be addressed in order for the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas regional 
constituency to be effective. 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
It is recognised world-wide that devolving decision making powers to ' grass-roots ' 
management institutions or user groups in line with central government policies can lead to 
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sustainable and equitable natural resource management (Botelle and Rohde, 1995). 
Community management is also viewed as the key to sustaining the supply of services to 
the poor (UNDP, 1990). However, for such institutions to manage their resources 
sustainably, they must have secure tenure of the land and the resources, and the benefits of 
management must be perceived to exceed the costs (Murphree, 1994; Cleaver, 1994). In 
addition, such local-level institutions must work within a framework that is socially and 
culturally acceptable, that takes account of existing social organisations and cultural 
attitudes (Botelle and Rhode, 1995). 
In the Khorixas regional constituency in Namibia, the lack of security of tenure of land and 
natural resources, inadequate mechanisms to implement policies at the local level and 
inappropriate institutional and social organisation arrangements could hamper any efforts 
for sustainable management of water supply. 
The Rural Water Supply Policy of 1993 in Namibia proposes to give communities control 
and responsibility for operation and maintenance of their boreholes (Department of Water 
Affairs, 1993). Water Point Committees are being established nation-wide to take overall 
responsibility for borehole management. The Government envisages that after 15 years 
communities will take full responsibility for their water supply (Koch, pers. comm., 1997). 
The policy makers are thus assuming that by creating these locally-based committees, the 
people in communal areas will be motivated to participate fully in the planning and 
operation of their water supply and will therefore use their resources sustainably 
(Department of Water Affairs, 1993). 
However, the land on which these communities live belongs to the State, affording resident 
communities little or no security. Due to the breakdown of powers of customary 
institutions, such as traditional chiefs and headmen to control and enforce any rules on use 
of land in communal areas, a system of open access exists for people and their l1vestock 
(MPhil. Baseline Report, 1996). Local communities do not have the right to exclude 
'outsiders' and regulate use of the resource. Without powers to exclude 'outsiders' who do 
not contribute to upkeep of water supply, successful management of water becomes 
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difficult. Moreover, this lack of secure tenure of natural resources acts as a disincentive to 
sustainable management of water and grazing land. 
This dissertation therefore, analyses the provisions of the Namibian Rural Water Supply 
Policy and the National Land Policy as they directly affect management of water in the 
Khorixas regional constituency. It examines the extent to which conditions are appropriate 
and mechanisms are in place to support local-level water management in the Khorixas 
regional constituency and possibly in other communal areas in Namibia. 
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
1.3.1 AIM 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the effectiveness of local-level 
institutions in the management of rural water supply in Namibia. The Water Point 
Committees in the Khorixas regional constituency will be used as an illustration. 
1.3.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this study are to: 
• provide a conceptual framework of the different natural resource management 
regimes1and their implications for sustainable local-level management of natural 
resources; 
1 
A resource regime is a structure of rights and duties characterising the relationship of individuals to one 
another with respect to that particular resource (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 1995). 
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• provide the rationale for local-level involvement in natural resource 
management; 
7 
• provide a brief overview of the socio-economic dynamics of communities m the 
Khorixas regional constituency; 
• review the Namibian Rural Water Supply Policy, with particular focus on the structure, 
role and capacity of the Water Point Committees, and assess the application of the 
policy in the Khorixas regional constituency; 
• provide a brief overview of the provisions of the National Land Policy in Namibia with 
particular focus on its implications for the communal areas; 
• analyse the extent to which the Rural Water Supply Policy and the National Land 
Policy in Namibia facilitate or hamper the effectiveness of the Water Point 
Committees in the Khorixas regional constituency; 
• examine the socio-economic conditions in the Khorixas regional constituency and 
assess their appropriateness for the effective functioning Water Point Committees; and, 
• make broad recommendations that are likely to improve the effectiveness of the Water 
Point Committees in the Khorixas regional constituency and elsewhere in Namibia. 
1.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA 
The Khorixas regional constituency covers the communal land in the southern part of the 
Kunene region in Namibia, formerly known as northern Damaraland (refer to Maps 1.1 
and 1.1). Following Namibia' s independence, a 'Delimitation Commission' was appointed 
to draw new regional administrative boundaries for Namibia which were not to be based 
on ethnic or tribal lines. The former Damaraland is now split into the southern part of the 
new Kunene region (where the Khorixas regional constituency is located) and the northern 
part of the new Erongo region (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997 citing Mhone, 1994 ). 
During the early 1960' s, the eastern areas ofDamaraland were extensively settled by white 
commercial farmers while the more marginal areas in the west were declared communal 
areas (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). By the mid 1960's many of the white farmers had 
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vacated their commercial farms, partly due to declining viability of commercial farming 
(Sullivan, 1996). During the early 1970's, the State purchased all farms that belonged to 
white farmers, and communal farmers from various parts of Namibia were moved into 
these new farms (Sullivan, 1996). It is generally believed that communal farmers were 
forcibly moved to these farms (Sullivan, 1996). 
The communal farmers were not settled into villages, rather individual families were 
settled at existing water points within expropriated farms. Todate, each farm has a main 
settlement (the old homestead) and a number of livestock posts up to a maximum of four. 
Generally, the old homesteads support a larger number of families, while the posts support 
a smaller number of people. The increasing human and livestock migration into the area, 
particularly during the drought periods has put pressure on natural resources like water and 
grazing land (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). 
The Khorixas regional constituency can be classified as arid to semi-arid. Rainfall is 
highly variable and erratic, both seasonally and spatially. It generally ranges from less than 
50mm along the coast to about 400mm per annum around Khorixas area. The main rainfall 
period is usually during the months of February and March (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997 
citing Mhone, 1994). These conditions give rise to frequent droughts. 
Water is therefore one of the most important and yet scarce resources in the region, both 
for human and livestock survival. The Government of Namibia consequently recognises 
that a water management policy is a critical component of the country's development 
strategy (National Planning Commission, 1995). 
1.5 METHODOLOGY OF THE BASELINE REPORT AND THE DISSERTATION 
1.5.1 APPROACH TO BASELINE REPORT 
Due to the multi-faceted nature of the study, a variety of methods were used to gather 
information. These are listed in this section : 
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• A preliminary one week visit to Namibia 
In November 1996, members of the study team visited Namibia and held discussions 
with different key stakeholders to determine the scope of the study. 
• Literature review 
Prior to the field visit m Namibia, members of the study team undertook a 
comprehensive literature review on Namibia in order to understand the nature and 
range of issues that were to be addressed in the study. 
• Interviews in Namibia 
The study team held interviews m Namibia with key stakeholders and relevant 
informants in government ministries and departments, non-governmental organisations, 
academic institutions, aid agencies, private agencies, independent consultants, 
prominent people in the communities who are familiar with the issues investigated 
including members of the Water Point Committees and some traditional leaders. All 
interviews were carried out between November 1996 and February 1997. 
• Field work 
Field work in the two case study areas in Namibia included: 
a) Observations on borehole infrastructure such as pump installations and 
reservoirs. The study team checked whether the boreholes yielded sufficient water 
for community needs and if boreholes were being serviced. The relation between 
animal watering points and where people obtained their water was also noted. 
b) Water analyses were conducted at different boreholes to assess the health 
impacts of water from the boreholes. 
c) Informal discussions were held with local people to obtain their views on 
the Rural Water Supply Policy. 
d) Qualitative analyses of soils and vegetation were carried out within a 500-
800 metre radius of the boreholes. Observations and informal interviews with 
the people living in the settlements were also conducted. 
e) A Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) technique was employed to gather 
information on: livelihood systems and resource use; borehole networks; 
demographic details; settlement patterns and livestock variations over time and 
socio-economic relationships. During the PRA exercises, the study team acted as 
facilitators. Local translators were used to interpret discussions with local people. 
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In the Khorixas regional constituency, field work was done in communities around 14 
boreholes, while in the Garn resettlement area, only 5 boreholes were visited. The . 
selection of the boreholes was largely based on availability of data on the boreholes and 
accessibility to the boreholes. 
1.5.2 APPROACH TO THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation has used some information collected for the Baseline Report. Additional 
information pertinent to this dissertation was collected by the author during the field work, 
and interviews were held in Namibia with government officials in different ministries. The 
government officials included senior officers in the Directorate of Rural Water Supply such 
as the Director of Rural Water Supply Division in Windhoek, the Regional Head of the 
Directorate of Rural Water Supply in Khorixas and the Senior Foreman responsible for 
maintenance of boreholes in Khorixas. Discussions with the officials of the Directorate of 
Rural Water Supply focused on the role, structure and status of the Water Point 
Committees and general implementation of the Rural Water Supply Policy, particularly in 
communal areas. An interview with the Director of Lands, Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation in the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation in Windhoek was 
also held. The interview focused on land use and land tenure problems in Namibia. The 
implications of the National Land Policy on natural resource management in communal 
areas were addressed. In Khorixas, interviews were held with some traditional leaders, 
members of the Water Point Committees and non-governmental organisations. 
Discussions focused on the implications of the National Land Policy on natural resource 
management in communal areas and the implementation of the Rural Water Supply Policy 
in the Khorixas regional constituency. In addition to these interviews, an extensive 
literature review has been undertaken. 
In order to provide the rationale for local-level involvement in common property resource 
management, this dissertation has provided a conceptual framework on common property 
management and the role of local institutions in natural resource management. Analysis of 
the relevant policies (mainly the Rural Water Supply Policy and the National Land Policy 
in Namibia) and how they affect the effectiveness of local- level institutions in managing 
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rural water supply in the Khorixas regional constituency has been made. Socio-economic 
conditions of communities in the Khorixas constituency are also examined since they 
directly affect resource management. Constraints likely to hamper the effectiveness of 
local-level institutions in management of rural water supply are identified. Where 
appropriate, the dissertation draws on experiences from other countries in order to provide 
some lessons for Namibia. 
1.6 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
1.6.1 ASSUMPTIONS 
This dissertation assumes that policies supporting local-level involvement in common 
property resource management can lead to equitable and sustainable management of natural 
resources. However, if the involvement of local-level institutions is not accompanied by 
adequate mechanisms and appropriate institutional arrangements that support 
implementation of these policies at the local level, sustainable management of resources 
may be difficult to achieve. 
This dissertation has used some of the information contained in the MPhil. Baseline Report 
(1997) to analyse the effectiveness of the Water Point Committees in the management of 
rural water supply in the Khorixas regional constituency. It is assumed that information in 
the Baseline Report is a true reflection of the situation in the Khorixas regional 
constituency and in Namibia. Moreover, it is assumed that there were no 
misinterpretations by the study team or the translators during the field work. 
1.6.2 LIMITATIONS 
A key objective of this dissertation is to analyse the extent to which the provisions of the 
Rural Water Supply Policy and the National Land Policy in Namibia hamper or facilitate 
the effectiveness of the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas regional constituency. 
One of the major limitations of this dissertation is that the Rural Water Supply Policy in 
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Namibia is still in the early stages of implementation. Workshops are being held country-
wide to discuss some of the concerns of the different stakeholders on the policy. The 
National Land Policy has been published as a Green Paper for comment and therefore 
certain provisions may change after the consultative process. 
As this dissertation had to be completed within three months, time was a major constraint. 
In reviewing the relevant policies in Namibia, in particular the National Land Policy, it was 
recognised that a comprehensive understanding of the historical background and 
complexities around the land issue in Namibia was necessary. Due to limited time to 
complete both the field work and the dissertation, the author of this dissertation as an 
'outsider ' may not have been aware of some of the salient issues that culminated in the 
present National Land Policy in Namibia. Finally, debates on common property resource 
management and the effectiveness of local-level involvement in resource management are 
extremely complex and have far reaching implications. Within the time available, it was 
necessary to focus only on specific aspects. 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is presented in six chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the 
preparation of the Baseline Report and the dissertation. The aims and objectives of the 
dissertation as well as methods used in compiling the Baseline Report and the dissertation 
are outlined. Assumptions and limitations of the dissertation are then spelled out. 
Chapter 2 provides a conceptual framework for common property resource management. 
The chapter describes the different ' resource regimes ' and their implications for local-level 
management. Using some of the experiences in southern Africa, the chapter illustrates how 
the ' common property regimes ' under certain conditions may be some of the more 
successful management systems for some natural resources. The chapter summarises some 
of the conditions that are necessary for the 'common property regimes' to be effective in 
natural resource management. It is argued that one of the most fundamental conditions 
necessary for the success of a 'common property regime' is 'genuine devolution ' of 
decision making and management powers to appropriate local-level institutions. 
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Chapter 3 provides a definition of devolution and outlines some of the objectives of public 
participation. The chapter highlights that although devolution has gained popularity 
amongst policy-makers world-wide, there have been different interpretations of what it is 
and what it means. The chapter outlines some of the attempts by different countries to 
increase public participation in environmental management. Some of the initiatives taken 
at an international level to facilitate devolution to local-level institutions are described. 
Finally, the chapter provides the rationale for the involvement of local-level institutions in 
natural resource management and summarises some of the conditions necessary for local-
level institutions to be effective. 
Chapter 4 describes the socio-economic characteristics of the Khorixas regional 
constituency and highlights some of the features that are likely to affect the effectiveness of 
local-level management in the constituency. 
Chapter 5 provides a review of the Namibian Rural Water Supply Policy and the National 
Land Policy. The main provisions of the policies are outlined with specific attention to the 
way they affect local-level management of rural water supply in Namibia and specifically 
in the Khorixas regional constituency. 
Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the extent to which conditions in the Khorixas regional 
constituency seem appropriate for supporting local-level management. This analysis draws 
from the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3, the description of the case-study in Chapter 
4 and the review of policies in Chapter 5. The chapter analyses the major provisions of the 
Rural Water Supply Policy and the National Land Policy and how they will affect the 
effectiveness of the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas regional constituency. Socio-
economic dynamics of the Khorixas regional constituency and how they will influence the 
effectiveness of the Water Point Committees are analysed. The chapter illustrates that 
there is lack of adequate mechanisms and appropriate institutional arrangements to 
implement and translate policies into practicable actions, thereby affecting the extent to 
which the Water Point Committees can be effective. 
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Finally in Chapter 7, conclusions and recommendations are made based on the findings 
in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 highlights that while local-level management of water in the 
Khorixas regional constituency is necessary and is the key to enhancing sustainable use 
of water in the constituency, creating effective management institutions will be a great 
challenge for the Government of Namibia. The challenge in creating effective Water 
Point Committees in the Khorixas regional constituency demands putting in place a 
variety of policy and institutional measures which will support local-level management. 
CHAPTER TWO 
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2. COMMON PROPERTY MANAGEMENT: A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The term ' common property' is generally understood to refer to resources which are 
communally owned and accessible for use by all members of the community. Under 
'common property ' it is often considered difficult to exclude others (IFAD, 1995). In 
natural resource management, use of the term 'common property' has been largely 
misunderstood and misused in the last decades (IFAD, 1995). Many planners and other 
development workers observing a situation where there is no management regime conclude 
that it is a situation of 'common property' (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). This 
misunderstanding has often led governments to formulate inappropriate policy decisions 
because resource degradation has been incorrectly attributed to 'common property' systems 
(Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). 
The use of the term 'common property resource' has also been controversial (IFAD, 1995). 
For example, IFAD (1995) argues that there is no such thing as 'common property 
resource', but that natural resources can be controlled and managed either as common 
property, state property, or private property. However, a review of the literature shows 
wide and accepted use of the term. 
In this dissertation 'common property resources' will be used to define those resources 
which are communally used and managed, while 'common property regime' will be used to 
define the management system for common property resources. Before proceeding any 
further, it is perhaps also appropriate in this section to define other terms which will be 
used frequently in this chapter and subsequent chapters. 'Resource regime' is a structure of 
rights and duties characterising the relationship of individuals to one another with respect 
to a particular resource (IFAD, 1995). 'Property right' is a claim to a benefit stream that 
some authority will agree to protect through the assignment and enforcement of obligations 
on others who may seek to enjoy that benefit stream (IFAD, 1995). When one has a right, 
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he/she has the expectation both in law and practice that his/her claims will be respected 
(Bromley and Cernea, 1989; IFAD, 1995). 
This chapter provides a background to the debates on common property management and 
local-level involvement in common property resource management. The chapter outlines 
different 'resource regimes' and then analyses the implications of these 'resource regimes' 
in terms of local-level common property resource management. Finally, the chapter 
summarises the advantages of a 'common property regime' and identifies conditions under 
which this 'regime' functions most effectively. 
2.2 COMMON PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM 
The interest in local common property management has evolved from debates over how 
systems of 'property rights' affect resource management. Historically, under common 
property resource management practised by rural communities, all members. of the 
community had access to resources, but rules and regulations on how to use the resource 
were determined by communities collectively. The most influential model in the analysis 
of common property management was Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons' in 1968 (Lawry, 
1990; Cousins, 1995). Ostrom (1990, p.3) however points out that, as far back in history 
Aristotle noticed the 'tragedy of the commons' by observing that: "what is common to the 
greatest number, has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, 
hardly at all of the common interest". Ostrom (1990, p.3 citing Gordon, 1954) further 
mentions that Gordon expounded a similar logic in what he termed 'The economic theory 
of a common-property resource: the fishery', which argued that: 
" .. . Wealth that is free for all is valued by no one, because he who is foolhardy enough for 
its proper time of use will only find it has been taken by another ... The fish in the sea are 
valueless to the fisherman, because there is no assurance that they will be there for him 
tomorrow if they are left behind today". 
Based on Hardin's model of the 'tragedy of the commons' two other models were also 
conceptualised, and became influential in explaining resource degradation whenever many 
individuals use a scarce resource in common. These are the ' prisoner's dilemma game' 
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and the 'logic of collective action' (Ostrom, 1990; IFAD, 1995). Central to each of these 
models is the 'free-rider' problem. Thus, whenever one person cannot be excluded from 
the benefits that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint 
effort, but to 'free-ride' on the efforts of others. If all participants choose to 'free-ride' then 
the collective benefit will not be produced. Of these models, literature suggests that the 
'tragedy of the commons' is widely known and has been used to explain the current 
environmental degradation of common property resources. 
2.2.1 TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
Using communal grazing as his model, Hardin argues that the private benefit of grazing an 
additional animal on a common range exceeds the private costs because the costs of 
maintaining the rangeland are shifted onto the group as a whole (Cousins, 1995). This 
occurs because the marginal costs of overgrazing are shared among the community users 
while the herder enjoys the total benefit of the added unit of production. Under such 
circumstances, rational herders will build up their private herds even after the carrying 
capacity of the commons is exceeded, thereby degrading the resource. Eventually, 
ecological collapse results. 
As the model of the ' tragedy of the commons' was applied to diverse problems such as 
firewood crisis in developing countries, acid rain and other environmental problems, it 
gained much interest globally. For Hardin, the solution to the ' tragedy of the commons ' 
was in tenure reform in the form of private property or state property in order to ensure 
sustainable use. At the heart of this conviction is that institutional change must come from 
outside and must be imposed on the individuals affected (Lawry, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). By 
describing communal use in terms of 'tragedy of the commons', Hardin's model did not 
consider the possibility of communal management or 'common property regime' as an 
alternative management regime and its potential to promote sustainable use (Hasler, 1996). 
This omission ignores the fact that many natural resources are not always open access, but 
are managed under traditional rules governing their use (Berkes and Farvar, 1989). Where 
open access may occur, "there are frequently cultural or political sanctions or practical 
restrictions ... which effect who has access to resources" (Hasler, 1996, p.20). 
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Hardin ' s rationale of the 'tragedy of the commons' influenced some of the policy 
prescriptions in the control and regulation of natural resources such as grazing, forests and 
fisheries particularly in developing countries. Recommendations were made by various 
writers and policy analysts that most natural resources be privatised or controlled by central 
governments. Nationalising the ownership of forests in developing countries for example, 
was advocated on the grounds that local villagers could not manage the forests in order to 
sustain their productivity and value in reducing soil erosion. Even more extreme was the 
recommendation by other writers that international authorities should control the use of 
natural resources (Ostrom, 1990). 
In southern Africa for example, Botswana developed its Tribal Grazing Lands Policy 
drawing the rationale directly from Hardin's model (Lawry, 1990). The Tribal Grazing 
Lands Policy programme, assisted by the World Bank, granted individuals long-term, 
exclusive lease rights to lands previously used for communal grazing. Implementation of 
this Policy excluded the needs of poor sections of the community since the costs of 
delineating clear property rights were prohibitively high (Lane and Morehead, 1996). The 
Policy led to emergence of a new ' elite of wealthy land owners who monopolised water 
sources and controlled the best grazing land (Lane and Morehead, 1996). 
2.3 RESOURCE REGIMES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR LOCAL-LEVEL 
COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Understanding different ' resource regimes' is considered significant here, because whether 
the resources are managed sustainably or not depends largely on how ' property rights' or 
' use rights' are assigned, and the incentives that they provide for conservation or depletion. 
In addressing resource degradation at the local level, it is also useful to understand the 
nature of property and authority systems. The failure to differentiate between the different 
' resource regimes' has often led to the confusion between common property resources and 
open access resources. This failure is apparent in the inappropriate policies that are often 
based on this confusion (Gibbs and Bromley, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). 
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Generally, natural resources can be held under any one of the four ' resource management 
regimes'. These are Communal Property or Common Property, State Property, Private 
Property and Open Access (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; IFAD, 1995). 
2.3.1 COMMON PROPERTY REGIME 
A common property regime represents a management system with its own authority 
mechanisms and ability to enforce operating rules (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Under a 
common property regime, ' use rights ' for the resource are controlled by an identifiable 
group and are not privately owned or managed by governments (Murphree, 1991; Hasler, 
1996). Groups hold customary ownership of natural resources such as grazing land and 
water sources (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Groups of resource users also practice 
traditional management systems to sustain productive use of their natural resources. 
Although the property-owning groups may vary in size and structure, "they are social units 
with definite membership and boundaries, with certain common interests, with at least 
some interaction among members, with some common cultural norms, and often their own 
endogenous authority systems" (Bromley and Cernea, 1989, p.15). There exist rules 
concerning who may use the resource, who is excluded from the resource and how the 
resource should be used. Thus, pragmatically this is a management ' regime' with rules on 
access to, or exclusion from proprietorship of natural resources (Hasler, 1996). The 
greatest advantage of this 'regime' as observed by various authors is that there is secure 
tenure which allows communities to have collective rights over land, resources and their 
benefits. 
Although enforcement is often difficult, a viable common property regime will usually 
have an in-built structure of economic and non-economic incentives that encourage 
compliance with existing conventions and institutions (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; IFAD, 
1995). 
One of the well known examples of such a ' regime ' in southern Africa is the Communal 
Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. 
The CAMPFIRE is an attempt by Zimbabwean Government to devolve responsibility and 
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benefits of wildlife through locally-based wildlife utilisation community property regimes 
(Hasler, 1996). The 1982 amendment of the Zimbabwean Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 
conferred privileges and rights on occupiers 'of communal lands as custodians of wildlife. 
The 1982 amendment was a departure from the former state controlled approach to wildlife 
management. The Act was based on the principle that efficient and sustainable wildlife 
utilisation was likely to be enhanced by local proprietorship. Proprietorship for wildlife 
was given to district councils to exercise on behalf of the communities. According to the 
1982 Act, district councils are legally in a position to enter into joint ventures or other 
economic undertakings for the benefit of their constituents (Thomas, 1991; Hasler, 1996). 
Although, the CAMPFIRE is neither without limitations (for example, with some district 
councils not genuinely promoting proprietal devolution to producer communities) nor is it 
a panacea to resource conservation in rural Africa, it has achieved discernible results. 
These include: a re-awakened appreciation of wildlife; poaching has been drastically 
reduced; increase in household revenues; improvement of habitats; the use of wildlife 
revenues for food security in times of drought and emergence of local environmental 




where proprietorship of common resources is given to local communities, they can 
improve their livelihood in flexible and adaptive ways 
communal management of natural resources can act as a powerful catalyst for 
communal institutional development and, 
• where local communities have secure tenure, sustainable use of the resource 1s 
enhanced (Murphree, 1994). 
When a common property regime becomes dysfunctional due to external pressures beyond 
the control of the group, or for whatever reason, then management of the resource cannot 
be exercised any longer. Under these conditions common property degenerates into open 
access and therefore resource degradation occurs. 
Various authors indicate that irrespective of the different natural systems (be it wildlife, 
water, fisheries, etc.) in which a common property regime functions, its success depends on 
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the following key conditions: social stability of the resource users; clearly defined 
boundaries of the resource and of resource users; presence of agreed rules by the user group 
and incentives to users. Each of these conditions is presented below. 
Social stability 
While property managing groups may vary in nature, size and internal structure, they 
should be social units with definite membership and boundaries and with certain common 
interests. Heterogeneity of interests within user groups presents potential difficulties 
(Lawry, 1990). 
There should at least be some interaction among members, with some common cultural 
norms and with their own endogenous authority systems such as tribal groups or extended 
families. It is important that individuals see themselves as members of one community 
(Ostrom, 1990; Thomas, 1991). Management authority should be vested in the respective 
group or its leaders. The group must recognise that they share dependence on the resource. 
To function effectively as a management 'regime', agreement on rules and guidelines for 
resource use is also required, and this is enhanced by cultural homogeneity and shared 
value systems (Ostrom, 1990). For institutional arrangements to be effective and to have 
long-term stability, all members of the group must have a voice in decision making and 
rule enforcement (Cousins, 1995). 
Clearly defined boundaries 
One important characteristic of a common property regime is that individuals or 
households who have rights to use the resource must be clearly defined, as must the 
boundaries of the resource itself (Ostrom, 1990). 
Without defining the boundaries of the resource and closing it to 'outsiders', local users 
face the risk that any benefits they produce by their efforts will be reaped by others who 
have not contributed to those efforts. At worst, the actions of others could destroy the 
resource itself (Ostrom, 1990). 
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Legal and institutional issues 
A functioning common property regime is one where members of the group are subject to 
mutually agreed rules accepted by all members of the group. There should be mechanisms 
for dealing with deviant behaviour and resolving conflicts amongst the users (IFAD, 1995). 
In the long-run, such rules will work, provided external government officials recognise 
their legitimacy (Ostrom, 1990). 
Enforcement of the rules may be a problem, but in a social setting where conformity is the 
dominant ethic, it is likely to be acceptable (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). It is also 
important that it is decided: where the control rests, whether it is vested in a village 
committee, households or elders; how disputes are to be settled and how sanctions will be 
imposed (Thomas, 1991). In this regard, a common property regime may need the support 
of government in the form of legislation. 
Incentives to the users 
Collective action is more likely to result where the common resource is critical to local 
incomes and is scarce (Lawry, 1990). Rarely are both these conditions present. If common 
property institutions are more likely to be effective where the resource is of critical 
economic importance to local users, then the prospects for bringing resources of relatively 
low economic value under improved common property management cannot be good 
(Lawry, 1990). 
A related issue worthy of consideration is that, collective action will be more difficult to 
achieve where interest in the resource as a source of income varies, or where resource use 
strategies differ significantly (Lawry, 1990). An example of a range management project in 
Lesotho illustrates this factor. A USAID funded project established an elected grazing 
association committee to manage control over a badly degraded watershed. One of the 
problems that the project encountered was that due to reliance of villagers upon external 
sources of income, in this case remittances from mine workers in South African mines, 
there was lack of interest by many in intensifying resource management. Dependence of 
_Lo~ca_l_le_v_e_lI_n_st_it_u_tio_n_s_a_n_d_Co~m-m_o_n_P_r~op~e-rt~y-R_e_so_u_r_ce_M~a-na~g~e-m_e_nt~~~~~~~~~~~~25 
rural communities on external sources of income is not a feature unique to Lesotho (Lawry, 
1990). 
2.3.2 STATE PROPERTY REGIME 
In a state property regime, control and management of the use of a resource rests with the 
state. In many cases the state decides who has access and how access will be controlled, 
for example by issuing licences or permits during closed seasons (Berkes and Farvar, 
1989). Individuals and groups may be able to make use of the natural resources, but only at 
the forbearance of the administrative agency charged with carrying out the wishes of the 
larger community (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; IFAD, 1995). Examples of a state property 
regime include state forests, national parks, fisheries and wildlife resources. The state may 
either directly control and manage the use of natural resources through government 
agencies, or it may lease the natural resources to groups or individuals who are given rights 
to harvest these resources for a certain period of time. A state property regime removes 
managerial discretion from the user and generally conveys no long-term expectations 
concerning tenure security. To be successful such a regime requires adequate human, 
financial and material resources. Often these resources are limited in most developing 
countries (IFAD, 1995). 
2.3.3 PRIVATE PROPERTY REGIME 
A private property regime is defined as a regime where the claim rests with the owner or a 
corporate body (Hasler, 1996). It gives the private owner the legal and social sanction to 
exclude others. An individual or few people are free to use and manage the resource as 
they wish. However, government may have legislation controlling use and access to these 
resources such as setting hunting quotas for wildlife or in cases of fishing, determining 
quotas during the closed season. 
It is argued that the benefits that emanate from the private control of land and related 
natural resources arise from the fact that the individual or group can make management 
decisions and investments in the full knowledge that good stewardship will return private 
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rewards (IFAD, 1995). One of the assumptions of this statement is that the owner chooses 
to manage the resource well and produce those items that are of value to society. A private 
property regime also appears to be stable and adaptive because it has the social and legal 
sanction to exclude excess population and to resist unwanted intrusions. A private property 
regime is similar to a common property regime in the sense that there is exclusion of non-
owners. 
However, to suggest that the private property regimes are necessarily appropriate for all 
natural resources would be a mistake. For example, most of the world's landlessness, 
particularly in Latin America can be attributed to concentration of land in the hands of a 
few powerful families (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Under the private property regimes 
therefore, poorer sections of the society can be marginalised and their poverty further 
perpetuated. When privatisation is recommended to address resource degradation, such a 
solution may be too simplistic, as it ignores the broader socio-economic implications of 
privatisation (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). 
2.3.4 OPEN ACCESS REGIME 
Open access has been described as a condition of 'free for all' (Berkes and Farvar, 1989). 
Murphree (1991) suggests that open access is not strictly a 'property-rights regime' nor is it 
a 'management regime' since people use the resources opportunistically but do not manage 
them. He makes a distinction between open access and a common property regime. Under 
a common property regime, 'use-rights' for the resource are controlled by an identifiable 
group and are not privately owned or managed by governments; there exist rules 
concerning who may use the resource; who is excluded from the resource and how the 
resource is to be used. 
Resource 'use rights ' under open access are neither exclusive nor transferable. These 
rights are owned in common, but are open to access by everyone and therefore property of 
no one. Open access results from the absence of enforcement of rules concerning use of 
the resources, or the breakdown of a management system and authority system whose aim 
was to introduce and enforce rules among participants with respect to the use of a natural 
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resource (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). For example, government may introduce new 
policies and management systems which interfere with functions of existing traditional 
rules regarding resource use and access, thereby leading to the breakdown of the long 
established approaches to resource management. 
Open access allows individuals to make use of scarce resources without regard for the 
future use of the resource and interests of others who may seek to use the same resource. 
Because there are no obligations to others, individuals are supposed to enjoy privilege. In 
short, an open access regime is a system of no law (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). 
2.3.5 IMPLICATIONS OF RESOURCE REGIMES FOR LOCAL-LEVEL MANAGEMENT 
The subject of ' resource regimes' is complex and is dependent on different variables 
existing in a particular situation (Murphree, 1991). For example, the nature of a particular 
resource whether it is confined to a particular micro-environment such as trees, or whether 
it is mobile such as wildlife, may determine which 'regime' would be more appropriate 
(Murphree, 1991). Furthermore, the socio-political context under which the resource is 
being managed will also determine which ' regime' is most appropriate. The situation is 
further complicated by the fact that, in practice, natural resources are rarely managed solely 
within one of these regimes. Due to the nature of the resource, a combination of 'property 
rights ' may have to be exercised. For example, wildlife could be managed by the 
communities with the state providing necessary legislative support to ensure that 
communities directly derive the benefits from the resource. 
Serious shortcomings have been identified in the history of the debates around common 
property resources. Debates on security of tenure of natural resources have largely been 
restricted to a discussion of the relative merits of the state or private property regimes, 
ignoring the further option of a communal property regime (Murphree, 1991). Proponents 
of privatised natural resource management have suggested that market dynamics coupled 
with long-term security of tenure provide the best ingredients for sustainable utilisation and 
efficient management. Proponents of state management usually rest their case on equity 
considerations or collective societal interest in common property resources. The exis.tence 
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of common property management is often excluded and its potential for sustainable use 
ignored (Lawry, 1990). 
The relative merits and weaknesses of the different ' resource regimes ' will be considered 
in this section in order to illustrate their implications for local-level management. This 
section specifically identifies some of the advantages of a common property regime over 
other resource regimes, and briefly discusses each of the advantages. These are: provision 
of security of tenure of resources for the communities; efficiency in management of natural 
resources; ensuring equity and ensuring economic and ecological sustainability. 
Security of tenure 
Contrary to the private and state property regimes where communities are not assured of 
secure tenure, or it is only vested in an individual or corporate body, a common property 
regime has an assurance of security of tenure of the resources to the communities. Where a 
common property regime functions and there is proprietorship of the natural resources 
concerned, the communities have security of tenure of the resources and should therefore 
be motivated to manage their resources sustainably (Murphree, 1994). Proprietorship in 
this sense is used to mean a sanctioned use-right, including the right to decide whether to 
use the resources at all , the right to determine the mode and extent of their use and the right 
to benefit fully from their exploitation in the way they choose. 
The example of the CAMPFIRE illustrates that when communities are supported by good 
enabling legislation and are free from bureaucratic restraints, they will assume 
responsibility for their environment. Without security of tenure it is unlikely that 
communities will invest in an uncertain future. Any resource regime that fails to fulfil this 
essential principle stands fewer chances of achieving sustainable use of resources at the 
local level (Murphree, 1994). 
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Efficiency in management of natural resources 
While the private and the state management regimes may be appropriate for given 
resources in given contexts, both have their weaknesses, particularly if they are under-
funded, large-scale and managerially distanced from the resources in question. In such 
circumstances, the state or the private owner purports to be the manager, but the de facto 
use and management are in the hands of people living with the resources concerned 
(Murphree, 1991). 
Neither the state nor the market have been successful in enabling individuals to sustain 
long-term productive use of natural resource systems. For example, an increase of 
government authority for management of local natural resources such as forests in 
developing countries has weakened local customary regimes and in most cases resulted in 
depletion of these resources (IFAD, 1995). Central authorities neither have sufficient time 
nor resources to enforce appropriate fines in order to induce co-operative behaviour. 
Communities on the other hand have relied on institutions resembling neither the state nor 
the market to govern some resource systems with reasonable degrees of success over long 
periods of time (Ostrom, 1990; IFAD, 1995). 
In most developing countries, the state property regimes are examples of the state 's reach 
exceeding its grasp (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Many states have taken on far more 
resource management than they can be expected to carry out effectively (Bromley and 
Cernea, 1989). Under such circumstances, state property becomes open access for all, and 
resource degradation occurs. An example of a state property regime which failed in Nepal 
is given by IFAD (1995). In 1957 Nepal's village forests were nationalised. The 
Government of Nepal converted a common property regime administered at the village 
level into a state property regime. Through lack of management capacity, the situation 
developed more into an open access regime, and forests which had been sustainably 
managed over a number of years were quickly depleted. 
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Equity 
Under certain conditions where the state has taken control of resources such as forests, the 
consequence is that nationalisation creates de-facto open access to resources where limited-
access common property resources had previously existed. While private and public forms 
of management may be efficient in some sectors such as industries, this does not apply to 
management of common property resources for which some potential beneficiaries cannot 
be excluded. Privatisation of commonly used resources for example, may mean assigning 
exclusive rights to one individual or firm thereby excluding the majority of people who 
depend on such a resource (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). 
Focus on the private and the state property regimes m certain conditions ignores the 
potential for cost-effective collective local management enforced by informal peer pressure 
and drawing on evolved and detailed knowledge of local ecological dynamics (Murphree, 
1991). Within a common property regime, the rights of individuals could be defined and 
limited to prevent overuse of the common resource. The needs of poor and small-scale 
users under a common property regime are likely to be met. If all follow the rules, 
resources will be allocated more predictably, efficiently and equitably (Lawry, 1990; 
Cousins, 1995). Conflict levels will be reduced and the resource system itself will be 
sustained over time (Ostrom, 1990). 
Economic efficiency and ecological sustainability 
The common property regimes m certain conditions have also proved economically 
efficient and ecologically sustainable (Cousins, 1995). This does not imply that problems 
of resource management cannot arise, but they have particular advantages which do not 
exist under the state or the private property regimes. 
Administration of the rights and duties under any regime has some transaction costs, be it 
costs of obtaining information, contracting agreements or enforcing rights and duties. 
However, under the common property regimes such costs can be significantly lower than 
under the private property regimes. The latter involve high social costs for recording, 
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adjudication and policing of titles, which rural resource users in marginal environments 
cannot usually bear and are often beyond the budget of a village economy (Cousins, 1995). 
While the application of the common property regimes also bear sorrie costs, but there are 
fewer claims involved. Existing local and customary institutions can more easily enforce 
rights and duties without cumbersome and prohibitive legal procedures, and yet achieving 
fairness (Cousins, 1995). 
Where livestock production is a central component of livelihood systems, the common 
property regimes have some ecological advantages. In arid and semi-arid environments 
which require a great deal of mobility, the common property regimes allow flexible but co-
ordinated arrangements by groups of herders and yet still provide security of tenure (Lawry, 
1990; Cousins, 1993). 
In rural Africa, the common property regimes provide needed levels of assurance for most 
poor people who live in conditions of poverty, natural resource dependence and other 
uncertainties (IFAD, 1995). They offer reduced environmental risk and are therefore 
appropriate for these high risk marginal environments (IFAD, 1995 citing Runge, 1986; 
Scoones, 1996). 
Berkes and Farvar (1989) describe the common property regimes as conservative and yet 
ecologically sustainable. The emphasis is on taking what is needed, and there are in-built 
rules and sanctions against excessive individual gain from a communal resource and 
against accumulation of surplus. Because the traditional use and management of resources 
often "incorporates rituals to help synchronise harvesting with natural cycles, the common 
property regimes serve to sustain productivity of resources through generations" (Berkes 
and Farvar, 1989, p.12). 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that the common property regimes provide fundamental 
advantages over other resource regimes. The common property regimes can provide: 
security of tenure to the resource users; equity amongst the resource users and economic 
_Lo~ca_l_le_v_e_l_In_st_it_u_tio_n_s_a_n_d_Co~m-m_o_n_P_r_op~e-rt~y-R_e_s_ou_r_ce~M-a_na~g~e-m_e_nt~~~~~~~~~~~~32 
efficiency and ecological sustainability, particularly in high risk marginal environments. 
However, given the complexity of situations and variability of resources, combinations of a 
common property, private or state regime may be necessary. The common property 
regimes may need to be co-ordinated with other regimes, because in reality few resources 
are ever managed under one regime. 
The CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe has demonstrated that the common property regimes can act 
as powerful catalysts for development of local-level institutions and community 
participation in resource management, in particular where such a resource has high revenue 
generating potential and is central to community development (Murphree, 1994). The 
CAMPFIRE experience also illustrates that local-level or community-based institutions can 
become effective organisations for sustainable resource management, but only if the state 
devolves authority and decision making powers to the resource users. Thus, genuine 
devolution of decision making and management powers to communities and local-level 
institutions is fundamental to the success of the common property regimes. Chapter 3 
discusses the concept of devolution and local-level institutions in detail. 





social stability of the user groups 
clearly defined boundaries of the resource 
clearly specified rules and guidelines, including enforcement, and conflict resolution 
mechanisms amongst the users 
• the common resource must be scarce and critical to local incomes and of high revenue 
generating potential 
• group membership must be small in size in order to be able to enforce conformity to 
rules through peer pressure and, 
• government must support local institutions through legislation so that rules can be 
effectively enforced. 
_Lo~ca_l_le_v_e_l_ln_st_it_u_tio_n_s_a_n_d_Co~m-m_o_n_P_r~op~e-rt~y-R_e_s_ou_r_ce_M~a-na~g~e-m_e_nt~~~~~~~~~~~~33 
However, not all the conditions are of high significance in determining the success of a 
common property regime. Table 2.1 evaluates these conditions in terms of their 
significance. The conditions rated as highly significant will be taken forward and used as 
the criteria for the evaluation of the case-study in Chapter 6. 
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Table 2.1: Evaluation of the conditions necessary for the success of a common 
property regime 
Condition Rating Comments 
Security of High Local communities must have security of tenure of the 
tenure significance resource, and must be able to control use of and access to 
the resource. Security of tenure is a key condition to the 
success of a common property regime. 
Genuine High When users of the resource do not have decision making 
devolution significance powers, they will not have a sense of responsibility for 
management of such a resource. Devolution of decision 
making powers is essential. 
Social stability High If the resource users are to take responsibility for 
of the user , significance management of the resource, they must see themselves as 
groups a homogenous community with similar problems and 
interests. 
Clearly defined High If the resource is open to 'outsiders', there will be no 
boundaries of significance incentive for local resource users to take responsibility for 
the resource management. 
Oearly High Without clearly specified rules and guidelines, 
specified rules significance enforcement of regulations regarding resource use 
and guidelines becomes difficult. 
Scarcity of the High to Rarely are both these conditions applicable to most 
resource and of ' medium 
resources. For example, water as compared to wildlife 
high revenue significance does not have a high revenue generating potential and 
generating therefore the resource users may not give priority to its 
potential management. 
Small group Medium Although the smaller the size of the resource users is, the 
membership significance more manageable it is, group membership may not be a 
major constraint if there are clear rules and guidelines on 
how the resource is to be used and these rules are 
enforced. 
Government High Government by enacting legislation can support 
legislation 
>. 
significance enforcement of rules by the resource users, and can 
devolve decision making powers to local resource users. 
CHAPTER THREE 
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3. THE ROLE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN NATURAL 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades there has evolved a new direction in the theory of environmental 
management which challenges the centrist mode of policy formulation and implementation 
(Murphree, 1994). This thinking advocates a shift in policy formulation and environmental 
management away from the central governments closer to the local communities and local 
institutions (Murphree, 1994). Policy-makers concerned with relationships between 
development and natural resource management have sought ways to promote better local-
level management of resources used in common such as grazing land, water, forests, 
wildlife and biological resources. Murphree (1994, p.5 citing Low, 1993:3) quotes: 
"While the planetary vision is compelling, and some problems such as ozone depletion and 
greenhouse gases must be addressed via global agreements, there is an emerging 
consensus that solutions for sustainability must come at the local level, driven by new 
visions and values, and empowered with new institutions". 
Due to this increasing interest by policy-makers in local-level management institutions, 
governments in different countries, particularly in developing countries have used pilot 
projects to test various models of local-level management (Lawry, 1990). Berkes and 
Farvar (1989) however, argue that perhaps the most important practical reason for 
governments to encourage local-level management institutions has been economic, because 
it makes economic sense to involve user-groups in management, especially where groups 
have proven their ability for self-management. 
This chapter gives a background to the evolution of the concept of devolution of power to 
the local level. Attempts by different countries to increase participation in environmental 
management are then outlined. A brief synopsis of Agenda 21 is given to illustrate some of 
the initiatives being undertaken at an international level to facilitate involvement of local 
institutions in natural resource management and other developmental issues. As one of the 
prerequisites for achieving sustainable development, Agenda 21 stresses the need for broad 
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public participation of communities and their local-level institutions in the decision making 
process. As a response to the call for broad public participation in Agenda 21, some 
organisations such as the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) 
have undertaken initiatives which promote broad-based participation in environmental 
management. The last section of this chapter analyses the role and effectiveness of local-
level institutions in natural resource management and highlights some factors that could 
affect their effectiveness. 
3.2 DEFINITION OF DEVOLUTION 
The term 'devolution' has been widely used in the context of policy formulation and 
implementation in both developed and developing countries. Attempts have been made to 
define devolution without a consensus of what it actually means (Johnson, 1994). 
Questions often raised when devolution is used include: devolving what; devolving to 
whom; what is the appropriate level of devolution; and how does policy define devolution 
(Murphree, 1994). In natural resource management, the meaning of devolution becomes 
even more critical as the question is, who has power to control and make decisions on how 
resources are used to serve both present and future generations? 
Calvert (1975) considers devolution as a 'species' of participation and decentralisation. He 
describes devolution as distribution of power and functions of central government from the 
centre to other territorial units such as a region or locality. Devolution, according to 
Calvert (1975) is not static, but is a dynamic process. Sewell and O'Riordan (1976) also 
argue that devolution may vary from country to country, as well as from issue to issue. 
What is desirable and effective in one country may well prove unsuccessful in another 
country. 
Given these perspectives, and if devolution is to be seen as a form or product of 
participation, some of the questions that become pertinent are: what is participation, who 
participates, why and how? 
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3.2.1 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
The basic rationale for public participation in natural resource management projects lies in 
the fact that 'top-down' government approaches have often failed (Catterson, 1988). 
Development projects implemented by governments with or without donor support have 
often attempted to apply shallow conceived technocratic solutions to poorly understood 
problems, and have in most cases degenerated into ineffective social welfare programmes 
(Catterson, 1988). The failure of this 'top-down' approach therefore led to the recognition 
for more public participation among those concerned with sustainable management of 
natural resources. However, despite wide support for participation, very little has actually 
been accomplished in achieving 'genuine' public participation, particularly in developing 
count~ies. Largely, this is explained by lack of clarity in meaning and consensus over what 
participation really entails (Johnson, 1994). 
Debates in developed and developing countries over the past two decades have espoused 
the need for public participation (Potter, 1985). The overall approach has been referred to 
in a variety of terms, including 'bottom-up' planning, 'grass-roots' planning, 'public 
involvement' and other related terms (Potter, 1985). Although the term participation may 
be used world-wide, its meaning, role, function and importance vary from culture to culture 
and from political system to political system. The reasons for seeking more participation 
also vary depending on: the perspectives from which the subject is approached; the 
institutional; political and economic context; and the personal interests and points of view 
of those opposing as well as supporting participation (Wengert, 1976). 
The term participation therefore, has different meanings and connotations depending on the 
situation to which it is applied, the ideology, motivation and practical orientations of the 
users. The reasons for seeking participation vary depending on the perspectives from 
which it is approached, the institutional, political and economic contexts. Participation can 
be used in the context of political decisions with respect to government structure and the 
importance of ' consent of the governed' as a prerequisite for development (Wengert, 
1976). However, it can also be applied to activities such as administrative planning and 
day-to-day management of public agencies. Demands for more participation may also be 
motivated by a desire to alter the power structure in government (Swilling, 1988). In South 
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Africa, for example, devolution of power to the local level in the 1980's was seen as an 
important democratic mechanism that would act as a useful counter-weight to central 
government power that often had a tendency to deprive 'Black' people of the right to 
participate regularly in government (Swilling, 1988). 
Due to this lack of clarity and consensus in definition, the meaning of participation has 
become vague. Johnson (1994, p.184 citing Lucas, 1976) comments: 
"One of the problems with defining participation is a lack of clarity and consensus over 
what it actually means or what it should achieve. Participation has come into vogue. It is 
on everybody's lips, but like many vogue words it is vague. Everybody wants it, but it is 
not clear what it is, and would be .... " 
Different authors including Arnstein (1969) and Sewell and O'Riordan (1976) attempt to 
give a more specific definition of participation. They highlight that participation basically 
seeks a greater degree of power sharing through politicisation of the citizen's awareness of 
his or her potential role as a member of the community of interest in shaping the quality of 
the environment. In this context, participation is to be seen as part of an evolutionary 
process of societal change which aims at political and social egalitarianism. It is the 
redistribution of power that enables the powerless citizens presently excluded from the 
political and economic process to be deliberately included in the future. However, as 
emphasised by Arnstein (1969), participation without redistribution of power, is an empty 
and frustrating process for the powerless. 
In order to clarify the confusion in analysis of participation, Arnstein (1969) developed a 
typology of eight levels of participation. Each level corresponds to the extent of citizen's 
power in determining the end product (see Figure 3.1). At the bottom of the ladder are 
'man:pulation' and 'therapy' which describe levels of non-participation that at times are 
contrived to substitute for genuine participation. At the top is 'citizen control' where once 
















Figure 3.1: Eight rungs on a ladder of citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969) 
Although application of this ladder has some shortcomings in the real world, it helps to 
illustrate that there are different gradations of citizen participation. It helps to understand 
the in reasing demands for participation from those who do not hold power as well as 
confusing responses from the powerholders (Arnstein, 1969). For example, in a number of 
cases, people are often manipulated to endorse decisions of government, and this is 
distorted to imply their participation in the decision making process. 
Despite these different variations m usage and interpretation, the definitions of 
participation have in common the philosophy of democracy, and that members of the 
public should have the opportunity to participate in the decision making process (Potter, 
1985). This is most possible, and most likely, at a small scale and where community 
interest is high, or where such activities seem to impinge most closely on their daily 
activities (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976). For example, it would be difficult to involve the 
public meaningfully in global or multinational environmental issues where the problems 
are complex, the geographical horizons wide and the degree of familiarity for any particular 
individual is very low (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976; Potter, 1985). 
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Although in principle, public participation can be regarded as an essential ingredient for a 
true democratic government and a cornerstone to sustainable development, Potter (1985) 
cautions that its implementation and operation can be plagued by serious problems such as: 
lack of clarity of who should participate; whether the public knows what it is they want; 
dissatisfaction of participants because their expectations have not been fulfilled in the past, 
and other reasons. He therefore suggests that the role of public participation should not be 
seen in isolation, but in the wider social and political contexts, since these factors have a 
direct bearing on its success. 
Within the debate to define participation, it has been acknowledged that participation is or 
can be facilitated by decentralisation. Although the term decentralisation has also been 
used to give different interpretations in different contexts, it has commonly been defined as 
the means of sharing power, usually of central government with other groups, each having 
authority within a specified area of the state (Mawhood, 1985). Groups in most cases 
imply units of local government in which formal decision making is primarily exercised by 
locally representative councillors or officials. In addition, amongst other features, such 
locally representative bodies should have power to hold land and property as their own and 
not belong to the government (Mawhood, 1985). Ultimately, the goal of decentralisation 
should be to gain effective achievement of locally selected goals (Kasfir, 1985). 
From the foregoing, key phrases that emerge as common to the definition of devolution are 
power sharing, representation, decision making and distribution of power within society. 
Implicit in this broad definition, and in the context of this dissertation, is the empowerment 
of local people to control and manage their natural resources. For the purpose of this study, 
a broad definition of devolution which encompasses these different aspects and in 
particular emphasising the empowerment of local people to control and manage their 
resources, will be adopted. 
3.2.2 OBJECTIVES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Several authors including Sewell and O'Riordan (1976), Korten (1985), Potter (1985) and 
Picard et al.(1994) have discussed how over the past several decades, development 
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programmes in different sectors (whether in health, agriculture, education, water supply 
etc.) throughout the world have been designed in national and regional capitals with 
government personnel hired to serve some group of beneficiaries. Seldom did such 
programmes presume that the beneficiaries would themselves have any role beyond using 
the services provided. 
As the weaknesses of this approach became increasingly evident to development 
professionals, there has been a tendency for donors to mandate local involvement and 
participation as a requirement of project implementation (Korten, 1985). Most 
governments faced with the inefficiency of centralised decision making, and in an attempt 
to stimulate the whole nation to participate in national development planning, have 
devolved structures of administration to either regional or district levels. At the local level, 
governments encouraged establishment of village councils or committees, in order to 
facilitate 'grass-roots' participation (Mawhood, 1985). However, as observed in most 
cases, there was never genuine devolution of decision making powers to the local level. 
Central control has been retained with little commitment to the political and administrative 
reforms that might ultimately lead to self-managing local structures (Korten, 1986). 
Moreover, decentralised structures were constrained by financial and human resource 
shortages (Korten, 1985). 
3.2.3 LIMITATIONS OF CENTRALISED SERVICE DELIVERY 
Four key limitations of centralised service-delivery that have contributed to the interest and 
commitment by governments to people ' s participation in the planning and implementation 
of development efforts are: their limited reach; their inability to sustain necessary local 
level action; their limited adaptability to local circumstances and their creation of 
dependency (Korten, 1985). Each of these limitations is briefly discussed below. 
Limited reach 
It is nearly impossible for government funded and supervised professionals to reach 
effectively into every village, with the result that particularly in rural areas, few 
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governments services reach more than 15 to 20 percent of the rural residents who may be 
entitled to them (Korten, 1985). The government is neither able to provide the numbers of 
staff and facilities required nor to insure effective supervision of these services . 
Lack of sustained local level action 
Development projects have often produced new facilities without adequate provision for 
their operation and maintenance. When implementation of projects is not accompanied by 
development of necessary skills amongst the local people, then maintenance of facilities is 
likely to deteriorate. 
Limited adaptability to local circumstances 
Government services are commonly designed by central planners who have little 
familiarity with the actual needs of the people they intend to benefit. Furthermore, these 
needs may differ substantially from one community to another, although centrally designed 
programmes are seldom able to take such differences into account. Consequently there is a 
poor fit between the needs of a given community and the nature of the services offered, 
result ing in underutilisation and consequent waste of resources. 
The creation of dependency 
The very ability of the poor to survive under the most unfavourable circumstances, 
suggests that they are quite skilled in meeting their own basic needs, even if only to 
standards intolerable to a socially conscious society. Too often government interventions 
seek to improve their lot not through interventions intended to strengthen their capacity for 
self-help action, but through doing for them what they did for themselves, with the 
government making decisions and providing the resources. As a consequence, people's 
former self-sufficiency turns to dependence on government, potentially leaving them even 
more vulnerable than before. 
_Lo~ca_l-_le_v_e_ll_n_st_it_ut_io_n_s_an_d_Co~rn-rn~on~Pr_o~pe_r~ty_R_e_s_ou_r_ce_M~an_a~g-ern~en_t~~~~~~~~~~~43 
Potter (1985 citing Conyers, 1982) and Cousins (1995) outline three important reasons for 
encouraging public participation in planning and implementation of development 
programmes. Firstly, public participation acts as a means of gaining insights into local 
conditions and needs of local people. Secondly, it is logical to assume that individuals will 
be more committed to plans if they are involved in their preparation. Thirdly, there is a 
philosophical reason that decentralisation and empowerment are now seen as eminently 
feasible as well as ethically desirable. 
However, the obstacles with which the development manager must contend in making 
participation a reality are nearly as formidable as the need for participation is compelling. 
Such obstacles may be found in the implementing agency, within the community itself and 
within the broader institutions of the society. Often many of these obstacles are ignored in 
programme design and management; hence many efforts to evoke public participation often 
fail (Korten, 1985). 
3.3 EVOLUTION OF DEVOLUTION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
Since the 1960's there have been dramatic changes in the role that the public may play in 
decisions relating to environmental management, with demands more intense in the United 
States and other industrialised countries such as Britain and Canada (Sewell and 
O'Riordan, 1976). These demands reflect major concerns. In most democratic societies, it 
is generally assumed that the individual has the right to be informed and consulted and to 
express views on matters that affect him/her personally. A second concern underlying 
pressures for greater power sharing has been the failure of past plans or policies to identify 
correctly the desires of the public (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976). 
Responses of different governments to the growing pressure for increased public 
participation have varied in nature and scope. Some governments have tried to effectively 
use existing institutions, while in some countries, responses have involved enacting new 
legislation, establishing new agencies, or expanding research and experimentation to find 
effective ways of involving the public (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976). 
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In the United States, for example, three responses were adopted to respond to the 
increasing pressure for public participation and citizen involvement in environmental 
decisions (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976). The first focused on more effective use of 
existing institutions. An agency such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and pollution 
control bodies began to make more constructive use of public hearings through improved 
information programmes, less restrictive requirements relating to preparation of briefs for 
different kinds of development schemes and staging meetings at more convenient times 
and places. The second response within the U.S.A. was enactment of new legislation 
which made it mandatory that the views of the public be actively sought. The most 
influential piece of legislation was the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 which 
requires full disclosure of possible environmental impacts of proposed federal policies and 
projects. A third step has been undertaking research and experiments to discover improved 
means of obtaining public participation (Potter, 1985). Simultaneously, federal agencies 
have taken the lead in broadening the basis of public involvement in resource management 
and environmental policy making. Several laws have been passed which either require or 
encourage public participation. 
In the United Kingdom, as a response to criticism on lack of public participation in 
preparation of development plans, one of the significant steps taken was establishment of 
the Skeffington Committee in 1968 (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976; Potter, 1985). One of 
the main tasks of the Committee was to suggest ways in which to foster greater public 
participation in the development planning process. Despite the criticisms that were made 
regarding some of the recommendations made by the Committee, its establishment marked 
an important step in the British planning system in terms of the role of the public in 
decision making (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976). 
In many developing countries and in particular in Africa, after independence the state was 
seen as a provider, intervening through state-owned and state-controlled enterprises or 
other means in virtually every area of economic and social life (Picard, et al, 1994). 
Later in the 1980s, practitioners, donors and academics in Africa recognised that there was 
a need to decentralise and increase participation at all levels of society in order to improve 
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the quality of policies, increase commitment in the implementation of programmes and 
enhance the sustainability of policies. However, the nature of such participation remained 
unclear. In some cases, decentralisation and greater participation was seen as abdication of 
state responsibilities (Picard, et al., 1994). 
Some of the early and most widely cited examples of public participation approaches in 
developing countries include the Ujamaa2 programme in Tanzania and the Indian 
community-based development programme (Potter, 1985). According to Potter (1985 
citing Conyers, 1982), the Indian community-based programme in the 1950' s was perhaps 
the most successful. The scheme involved the establishment of local councils supported by 
teams of technical officers and multi-purpose community development officers at the 
village level (Potter, 1985). Although this programme has been criticised for doing little in 
reducing inequities that existed and affording limited involvement of the majority of the 
population, it however represented an attempt by which the public could participate in the 
development process. 
As governments in developing countries and donors talked increasingly of shifting the 
rights to manage resources to local communities, project documents were prepared laying 
out policies and strategies that would enable people 's participation in the design of projects 
and in managing their resources (Toulmin, 1991). 
However, Toulmin (1991) indicates, there are still many questions about this process of 
shifting responsibility that have not been considered. These include: 
• 
• 
At what level is the community to be defined? The village, or group of villages, the 
herding camp, or herders ' associations? Must new structures be set up or can control be 
vested in existing social organisations? Given the heterogeneous nature of 
communities, is there a representative body at the local level able which is able to 
manage and control access to resources fairly? 
If power to manage resources is vested in each village or herder ' s group, what support 
will they need from local government in terms of effective enforcement of their rights 
2 Ujamaa is a Swahili word that means collective action. 
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• 
and the technical support and skills required to make the most of these resources. Can 
local government provide this support? 
What rights should indigenous populations have to set the terms on which outsiders can 
obtain access to their land, water, trees and pasture. If indigenous populations do not 
have firm control over rights of access, what incentive do they have for investing in the 
careful management of these resources? 
Toulmin (1991) argues that in most cases governments in developing countries have been 
pushed by donors to talk about greater participation by their populations in the 
development process and in the management of their own resources, while in reality, 
governments have made little progress in transferring real power away from the centre. 
The new 'conditionality' and pressure for multi-party democracy now coming from many 
bilateral funders are further recent trends in this direction (Toulmin, 1991). Where such 
devolution has taken place, according to this view, it is likely to be in cases where the state 
can divest itself from certain costly obligations, for example by transferring responsibility 
for maintenance of boreholes to pastoral associations, and by handing over the role of 
maintaining irrigation schemes to water user groups (Toulmin, 1991). In some Sudano-
Sahelian countries in West Africa, governments have been uneasy about the notion of 
popular participation. Participation of rural people in decision making has been seen to 
constitute a new and potent threat to already tenuous political situations (Catterson, 1988). 
Thus, while transferring rights and responsibilities to local people to manage their own 
resources is desirable, and may be an important step towards achievement of sustainable 
development, it is however pertinent that this is not done in isolation from other broader 
socio-political issues. Participation may also occur at different stages of project cycle, 
either in the planning, design, implementation or management. While ideally participation 
may be aimed for all these stages, in reality it is difficult to achieve, because each level has 
its own complexities (Kiss, 1993). 
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3.4 AGENDA 21 AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS 
Perhaps, one of the most remarkable events that occurred in this decade is the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 
June 1992; commonly referred to as the Earth Summit. One of the principal outcomes of 
this Conference was adoption of Agenda 21. 
Agenda 21 is the most comprehensive action plan for the 1990s and beyond, adopted by the 
international community (Robinson, 1993). Section 2 of Agenda 21 stresses that one of the 
fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public 
participation in decision making, particularly those decisions that affect the communities 
dir'ectly (Robinson, 1993). Section 2 further emphasises that commitment and genuine 
involvement of all social groups will be critical to the effective implementation of the 
objectives, policies and mechanisms agreed by Governments in all programme areas of 
Agenda 21. 
Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 gives special attention to support by international organisations 
and development partners to local institutions such as local authorities. The basis for this 
action is that local authorities and other locally-based institutions represent the levels of 
governance closest to the people, play a vital role in educating, mobilising and responding 
to the public to promote sustainable development and are crucial for turning policies into 
appropriate action (Robinson, 1993; Wynberg, 1993). 
As a response to the call for support to local institutions in Agenda 21, initiatives have 
been undertaken by international organisations like the International Council for Local 
Environmental Initiatives. The ICLEI (1993) recognises that community sustainability 
cannot be imposed in a 'top-down' manner. If sustainable development is to be achieved, 
there is need for broad-based consultation and participation of all community members 
(ICLEI, 1993). 
For this reason, ICLEI has designed Local Agenda 21, which is a campaign to mobilise 
local government leaders, community organisations and other local-based organisations to 
work together to create a strategic plan for their own community. Because the Local 
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Agenda 21 concept relies upon citizen involvement, Local Agenda 21 campaigns begin 
with an educational programme to inform local institutions about Agenda 21 and its 
implications for the local community. Local communities involved in the implementation 
of Local Agenda 21 need to determine their own priorities in solving environmental and 
development problems that they face (ICLEI, 1993). 
This brief summary of Agenda 21 and some of the initiatives that are being put into action 
at an international level, illustrate the underlying assumption that, locally-based institutions 
know what issues are most critical to the sustainability of their communities. In a broader 
context, ICLEI (1993) views the support to local institutions as an attempt through which 
desired global results could be achieved. 
3.5 LOCAL-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIRROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
It is acknowledged that common property resources should be used sustainably (Berkes, 
and Farvar, 1989). However, a major question is how this objective can be achieved. Key 
questions to be addressed include: Should management of resources adopt a 'top-down' or 
'bottom-up ' approach? Should management be based on systems employed by developed 
countries, or should indigenous resource-management systems be adapted in managing 
resources and use existing traditional institutions? (Berkes, and Farvar, 1989). 
There is an emphasis world-wide that local institutions and local communities should be 
integrated as key actors in defining and implementing development priorities. However, in 
some countries, it is only since the Earth Summit that involvement of local institutions and 
use of indigenous knowledge systems in management of natural resources has been given 
serious attention (Lalonde and Morin-Labatut, 1993). 
In sub-Saharan Africa for example, numerous natural resource management projects have 
been implemented, but in many cases these projects have not had a lasting impact 
(Critchley and Reij , 1996). A major lesson drawn from these projects poor performance, is 
that beneficiaries were not sufficiently involved in the planning and design of projects that 
are intended to help them. The projects are usually designed by outside experts who do not 
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understand local conditions. Perceptions and priorities of land users, and presence of 
existing institutional structures are often ignored. As a consequence, most projects fail to 
achieve the desired results. 
The current interest in local-level management institutions in natural resource management 
therefore, stems from the fact that local institutions have more information about the 
resources and problems at local level (Berkes, and Farvar, 1989). Any sustainable 
management practices therefore, have to utilise this potential. Korten (1986) argues that 
there are three reasons for which local-level of resource management is essential. Firstly, 
local management institutions and community-based resource management systems have 
unlimited potential to respond to the needs and preferences of their communities. 
Secondly, local institutions have potential to mobilise a variety of resources from 
communities to the extent that the costs of management can be far cheaper than where 
management is done by central institutions. Lastly, local institutions are more accountable 
to the people. 
Evidence around the world has shown that, since time immemorial, people have 
accumulated knowledge about their natural environment and solving their day-to-day 
problems. Societies or communities whose livelihood depends on natural resources have 
managed these resources over millennia on a sustainable basis, hence the reason why some 
of these resources exist today (Berkes and Farvar, 1989). For example, in nomadic 
societies in the Middle East and Africa where the communities have kept their traditional 
range-management systems, they do better than those which have abandoned them due to 
external pressures. Similar success stories have been observed amongst fishing 
communities in West Africa and in Turkish coastal areas (Berkes and Farvar, 1989). The 
example of the CAMPFIRE which has already been referred to in Chapter 2, demonstrates 
the viability of devolving responsibility for management of natural resources to local 
institutions. 
However, the introduction of inappropriate policies and legislation, such as nationalisation 
of natural resources previously managed by local communities, or privatisation of natural 
resources, have undermined these local institutions and their resource management systems 
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(Lalonde and Morin-Labatut, 1993; IFAD, 1995). By undermining local institutional 
structures and their management systems, sustainable traditional resource management 
strategies and the social fabric of local communities have either been weakened or eroded. 
An example of the Barabaig pastoral nomadic community in northern Tanzania, cited by 
Lalonde and Morin-Labatut (1993), illustrates the plight of many societies in Africa, where 
new government policies and programmes have undermined existing local institutional 
structures and management systems, and the outcome has been severe resource 
degradation. Over the years, the Barabaig community had maintained the productivity of 
their land by practising a highly developed system of sustainable resource management 
suitable to the semi-arid conditions of the area. The land and the water resources were 
protected through a system that allowed the use and access of common land in a manner 
that would not denude it beyond recovery or deprive other users. 
In 1968, a mission funded by Canadian International Development Agency identified the 
area of the Barabaig as ' idle ' , and therefore to be put to 'better use'. In 1970, the 
Government of Tanzania appropriated large tracts of land from the Barabaig in order to 
implement a large-scale foreign aid scheme - the Tanzania Canada Wheat Programme. The 
Barabaig were denied access to the area. As a result of mechanised monocropping of 
wheat, there was increased soil erosion and the overall carrying capacity of the land was 
overextended. The situation was worsened by the gradual breakdown of the Barabaig 
hierarchy of judicial institutions that controlled use of land, interpreted customary rules and 
adjudicated in conflicts over rights and duties. 
Since the 1980' s, in southern African countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and 
Namibia, there has emerged a new set of principles and policies which represent a reversal 
of the old ' top-down ' models for development and resource depletion, particularly in the 
management of wildlife (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995). Some of the reasons that triggered 




the threat of species extinction 
widespread poaching and loss of habitat 
the growing inability of states to protect wildlife resources 




human population growth and associated development needs fuelled conflicts between 
local communities and protected areas, and, 
participatory forms of planning and management had proven a success in development 
and thus suggested replication for wildlife management and probably other natural 
resources . 
A key objective in these policies is that participation of local communities and community-
based institutions in decision making and management of wildlife resources should be seen 
as the cornerstone to the sustainability of the resources (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995). 
A review of the literature also suggests that there are different types of local institutions 
which should be considered in natural resource management. These are: 
• local administrative agencies of government operating in a regulatory mode, setting 






local governments responsible to the community, but functioning within the state's 
formal legal framework 
membership organisations dealing with the resource and with associated productive 
activities in functionally specific ways to serve member's needs, operating by pooling 
member's economic resources, called co-operatives 
service organisations, working on a non-profit basis to protect or regulate natural 
resource use; private businesses, utilising resources according to calculations of 
profitability over time and according to established business practices 
private businesses utilising resources according to calculations of profitability over 
time and according to established business practices, and finally, 
use-management organisations carried out by individuals and households according to 
traditional community norms and personal understandings of the limits and possibilities 
of resource exploitation. 
Each of these above mentioned institutions has advantages and disadvantages that need to 
be weighed in specific contexts (Uphoff, 1986 ). For example, government agencies may 
be more appropriate where there is conflict over the resource amongst different users. 
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In the context of rural Africa, use-management organisations have been recognised as 
important to the success of sustainable natural resource management. This is an option 
whereby the participants see their actions and the institutions they develop as indigenous, 
developed on a participatory basis by members of the community. Moreover, in use-
management organisations, local communities are more homogeneous in interests and have 
the information and local knowledge about the resources (IFAD, 1995). However, use-
management organisations, even with good leadership, cannot operate in isolation. They 
need to work with others of their kind, or be co-ordinated with some of those outlined 
above (Murphree, 1994). They also need to be linked vertically with other relevant 
institutions, especially central government agencies responsible for setting policies and 
providing human and financial support to such local institutions. 
Simultaneously, the viability and effectiveness of a local institution will be determined by 
the different factors. These include: identifiable resources and resource users; assessment 
of costs and benefits of resource management and characteristics of the resource and of the 
users (Uphoff, 1986). These factors contribute to choosing or preferring different local 
institutional arrangements for the respective natural resource management tasks. A 
discussion of each of these factors is presented below. 
Identifiable resources and resource users 
What kind of local institution will be effective and sustainable for natural resource 
management also depends on the composition of the community of resource users, in 
particular whether they constitute an identifiable community. It should be established 
whether the resource users have some established and effective authority structure whose 
legitimacy and structure is recognised and accepted. Where the resource and the users are 
more definite and identifiable, local institutions are more viable. Conversely, when the 
resource users are difficult to identify and there is great variability over time in availability 
of the resource, higher level institutions have a greater role to play in natural resource 
management. 
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Assessment of the costs and benefits of resource management 
An assessment of the costs and benefits of local natural resource management will vary 
according to the time span and the geographical area involved. Also affecting the 
assessment is the degree to which both costs and benefits are borne by the same persons. 
Four dimensions can be identified which can vary with respect to costs and benefits of 
resource management. These are: 
-Temporal dimension, benefits accrue immediately or very soon, or accrue after a long 
time. 
-Spatial dimension, benefits accrue locally or remotely. 
-Tangibility, benefits are quite evident or are relatively hard to identify. 
-Distribution, benefits accrue to the same persons who bear the costs of management, or to 
different persons from those who bear the costs of management. 
This analysis thus presumes that managing natural resources has some cost, either in the 
form of direct investment of labour and funds or abstaining from some present use to 
preserve the resource over time. Local institutions will therefore be most effective where 
natural resource management benefits accrue quickly, locally, visibly and to those who bear 
the cost. In such circumstances, it pays for individuals and groups to take responsibility for 
a resource (Uphoff, 1986). 
Characteristics of the resource 
The nature of the resource being managed will affect how desirable certain institutional 
options are. Three different characteristics are important to take into consideration. These 
are: 
Renewability. The less renewable a resource is, the more risk there is that poor 
management will have drastic consequences, and the more reason central government's 
involvement may be more important. 
Seasonality. The flow of local institutional activity is generally affected by variations in 
seasons. Whatever kinds of local institutions are charged with natural resource 
management responsibilities, under conditions of high seasonality they will need to operate 
with more flexibility and informality. 
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Perceptions of resources. How resources are perceived by users is an important 
consideration. If user groups are unable to exclude anybody from using a resource, they 
have little incentive to invest in its development or protection. 
Characteristics of the users 
Characteristics of the users are also important in considering the viability of any local 
institutions. The following issues need to be taken cognisance of: 
Interdependence. To the extent that the resource users are dependent upon one another for 
their livelihood system and even survival, the incentives for making local institutions work 
are greater. 
Homogeneity. The tasks of local institutions in natural resource management are greatly 
simplified when users are homogeneous since decisions can be more uniform. Conflict 
over natural resource use is unlikely when users see themselves as unified by kinship, 
occupation or on some other basis. 
Tradition. To introduce modem institutions that compete with traditional ones is usually 
unlikely to be successful. Local institutional development should build as much as 
possible on existing roles and responsibilities that support natural resource management. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted that, although devolution of power to local institutions or 
communities, is in theory, applauded by everyone, it can be difficult to achieve in reality. 
In managing natural resources at the local level, governments must however, recognise that 
local institutions are key actors in managing the use of the resources. Governments 
therefore, should be willing to release power and control and give legal mandates to local 
institutions for resource management where conditions suggest that local-level 
management will be sustainable. Where there are existing traditional institutions, they 
should be strengthened rather than creating new structures. 
Natural resource management policies and programmes should recognise existing 
traditional management systems. Policies and programmes which ignore existing practices, 
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contribute to erosion of sustainable traditional resource management strategies and weaken 
the social fabric of local communities. The indigenous knowledge systems should be 
utilised where appropriate, as they offer the most appropriate basis for identifying problems 
and devising solutions that are environmentally and socially sustainable. 
There are different kinds of local institutions for resource management and the choice of 
institutional arrangements will depend on a variety of factors. The key factors are: 
identifiable resource and resource users; assessment of costs and benefits of resource 
management; characteristics of the resource and resource users. Effectiveness of any local 
institution in natural resource management will be determined by these factors. In 
addition, the nature of the resource may require a combination of different institutions, 
because in reality each institution does not work in isolation. To the extent that the 
resource and resource users are well known and identifiable, local institutions become 
viable. When availability of the resource is variable over time and resource users cannot be 
easily defined, higher level institutions have a greater role to play in natural resource 
management. 
While these conditions are all important in determining the effectiveness of local-level 
institutions in natural resource management, they may not necessarily be applicable in 
different settings. Moreover, their significance will be determined by the nature of the 
resource and the local conditions. An evaluation of these conditions in terms of their 
significance in determining effective functioning of local-level institutions is made in Table 
3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Evaluation of the conditions necessary for the effective functioning local-
level institutions 
Condition Rating Comments 
Genuine High significance Without decision making powers, local-level 
devolution institutions will not take full responsibility for resource 
management , nor be held accountable for any failures. 
Using existing High significance Traditional institutions are more familiar with local 
traditional problems. They are usually regarded as 'legitimate' 
institutions structures by local communities, and due to their 
closeness to communities, they can solicit community 
support for natural resource programmes. 
Utilising High significance Where communities feel indigenous knowledge has 
indigenous been ignored, they will not be committed to take 
management responsibility for resource management. 
systems · 
Assessment High significance Where the benefits of resource management are 
of costs and perceived to exceed the costs, resource users will be 
benefits motivated to manage the resource. 
Different High significance Due to the complexity of issues to be considered in 
institutions resource management, different institutions have to 
to be work together capitalising on their strengths and 
co-ordinated weaknesses. 
Variability of the High significance Where the resource such as water is variable over time, 
resource local-level institutions functioning on their own may 
not be effective management institutions. 
Resource users High significance If resource users are not well defined, local-level 
are well defined institutions without assistance of other institutions have 
limited chances of success. 
The above table illustrates that all the conditions are of high significance in determining the 
effective functioning of local-level institutions. These conditions will therefore be taken 
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The Khorixas regional constituency in the southern Kunene region in Namibia, formerly part of 
northern Damaraland region comprises of communal land which prior to independence of 
Namibia in 1990 was administered by 'second-tier authorities ' consisting of traditional leaders 
(Sullivan, 1996). These traditional leaders had powers to allocate and control use of resources 
such as grazing land and water. Traditional leaders were also responsible for resolution of 
conflicts within their communities (Rohde, 1993). Following independence of Namibia, the 
powers of these traditional leaders declined to that of intermediaries between government 
officials and communities (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). However, the former Damaraland 
region continues to maintain its strong social, economic and cultural character (Rohde, 1994). 
A description of the Khorixas regional constituency is given in Section 1.4. 
Population of the Khorixas regional constituency has increased in the last twenty years, largely 
due to human migration into the constituency and natural increase (Rohde, 1994). In 1992 the 
population of the catchment area around Khorixas town was estimated at 4,000 people (MPhil. 
Baseline Report, 1997 citing Jones, 1995). This population growth coupled with ineffective 
state control puts pressure on the scarce resources such as water. 
This chapter exammes the socio-economic characteristics of communities in the Khorixas 
regional constituency and traditional resource management systems as they have evolved in the 
constituency and in the region. As a more in-depth analysis of the socio-economic 
characteristics and resource management in the Khorixas regional constituency has been 
covered in the MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997, this chapter will only highlight those issues which 
are relevant to this dissertation. 
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The archaeological records of the Damaraland reg10n indicate that land use and resource 
management in this region were based on extensive mobility and flexible strategies in 
adaptation to environmental conditions of the area (Sullivan, 1996). This flexibility in resource 
management has continued todate. Social organisation in the former Damaraland region (which 
the Khorixas regional constituency forms part of) is highly adaptable, flexible and resilient, 
reflecting on the ecological conditions of the region (Rohde, 1994). Adaptability is manifested 
in reciprocal exchange networks amongst kin and neighbours who share resources and assist one 
another when necessary (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). Family members and communities 
manage the resources such as grazing land and water communally. 
In this productively marginal environment, individuals, families and communities are able to 
over-come some major hazards by 
"actively negotiating between themselves, on an ad hoc basis, in an effort to extend survival 
strategies. Communal tenure in the region, is a dynamic system demonstrating the system's 
overall strength by its ability to provide a large number of people access to scant resources" 
(Rohde, 1993, p.2). "When this system is disrupted by changes such as ill-conceived 
programmes and politically correct 'bottom-up' initiatives involving community participation, 
often relying on management structures, which fit neatly into a 'western' planning model, but 
take little account of existing social organisation and cultural attitudes, such development 
programmes and initiatives are all likely to be ineffective and to exacerbate existing problems" 
(Rohde, 1994, p.l). 
Thus, each family in the region cannot be viewed as an independent entity. Rather, families are 
inter-connected and share resources such as water, grazing land and even food when necessary 
(MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). 
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Livestock farming is the main economic activity in the constituency providing cash and food for 
family needs. Lack of diversification of the local economy and shortage of alternative skills 
characterises much of the Khorixas regional constituency (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). 
Average cash return from livestock is about N$1,200 per annum (Rohde, 1994). Culturally, 
large herd sizes are considered as a sign of social status within the community (MPhil. Baseline 
Report, 1997; Muruwoa, pers. comm., 1997). Any policies to reduce livestock numbers 
therefore have to take into account the importance of livestock as a source of income, form of 
food security and its cultural value (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). 
Livestock farming however, is mostly subsistence and farmers have to supplement their cash 
incomes from other sources such as pensions (N$135 per month), or support from family 
members and neighbours who work in nearby urban centres or some 'informal' activities 
(MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). "Many people live on the edge of survival relying on help from 
extended family and neighbours" (Rohde, 1994, p.5). Pensions form a reliable source of 
income for the majority of households in the constituency and in the region. 
Like in many other non-equilibrium3 grazing systems, farmers in the Khorixas regional 
constituency practice herd mobility, tracking animals around when forage is not sufficient in 
their home area (Rohde, 1994). This flexible exchange of use rights is an advantage 
characteristic of most non-equilibrium environments in pastoral areas (Behnke, 1994). In 
resource management such flexibility allows animals to move around avoiding areas where 
forage is insufficient (Behnke, 1994). However, in the Khorixas regional constituency, the 
undefined rights of access and lack of control over communal resources lead to 'incursions' by 
'outsiders', thereby putting pressure on the scarce resources (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997) (see 
Plate 1 ). 
3 Non-equilibrium describes those environments with highly dynamic ecosystems where populations or other 
components are not in the long-term balance with other elements of the system and are unpredictable. Non-
equilibrium environments are typical of arid and semi-arid zones where rainfall variability is high. 
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Community profiles around the water points in the Khorixas regional constituency vary between 
settlements. People using a water point at any particular time are not necessarily related nor are 
they a homogenous group with common interests. One settlement could consist of pensioners, 
young adults who often migrate to urban centres for employment, young family members not in 
employment, herders, ' absentee ' farmers who spend varying amounts of time on the farms or 
those employed in the formal sector in urban areas who return home over weekends or rarely 
visit (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). A fluid network of community exists. The settlers have 
moved in at different times and users of a water point include a wider network involving 
movement to and away from the settlement over time. This mobility of people is a function of 
the flexibility afforded by communal tenure for individuals to undertake a wide variety of 
economic strategies (Rohde, 1994). Within any farm settlement, it is also common to find 
extreme herd sizes within family groups (Rohde, 1994). 
4.4 LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES AND RESOURCE CONTROL IN THE 
KHORIXAS REGIONAL CONSTITUENCY 
Until independence of Namibia, communal areas were administered separately by the Statutory 
Legislative Council through ' second tier authorities ' consisting of both recognised and State 
appointed traditional leaders and councillors (Hangula, 1995). Rights of access to land were 
negotiated on an informal basis and disputes were rarely taken above the level of ward 
leadership (Rohde, 1994; Hangula, 1995). Headmen often consulted their councillors and 
community before granting or denying rights of residence to an 'incomer' and membership to an 
ethnically defined community conveyed automatic rights to land (Rohde, 1994). 
At independence, the laws which constituted the 'second tier authorities ' were repealed and 
their powers removed (Rohde, 1994; Hangula, 1995). All property under the control of the 
Damara Authority reverted to the Government of Namibia. This included land and all water 
installations (Hangula, 1995). Headmen lost much of their 'official' status, and yet in the 
absence of a strong state control, they retained a strong role in land allocation and land disputes 
(Rohde, 1994). Theoretically therefore, the lack of strong state control over communal 
resources means that there prevails an open access regime over all communal resources such as 
grazing land and water (Rohde, 1994). 
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After independence, all property held by regional authorities reverted to the State (Sullivan, 
1996). The former regional administration in Khorixas is now headed by central government 
appointees, and the position of tribal leaders is seen as largely symbolic (Sullivan, 1996). The 
role of traditional chiefs has been downgraded to that of intermediaries between communal 
dwellers and government officials (Rohde, 1994; Fuller and Turner, 1996). However, in practice 
headmen and councillors still fulfil important roles in terms of land allocation and land disputes 
(Rohde, 1994; Fuller and Turner, 1996). Although traditional chiefs and former councillors have 
lost their official status and power, they still have an important influence amongst communities 
(Rohde, 1994). Thus, in practice, although the role of traditional leaders has been downgraded to 
an advisory role, they still have an important influence amongst the communities who see them as 
their ' legitimate ' representatives on any issues affecting the communities. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
A flexible and adaptable communal management system or common property regime in the 
former Damaraland region has enabled communal farmers to manage their resources sustainably 
in a productively marginal environment over centuries. This flexibility is inherent in the social 
organisation of the communal farmers in the constituency, whereby a reciprocal exchange system 
operates amongst the farmers. Farmers manage and share resources to assist one another when 
necessary. However, introduction of new policy changes without recognition of the strength of 
the existing social organisation and survival strategies may exacerbate rather than solve the 
problems in the constituency. Moreover, policy changes which introduce new resource 
management institutions excluding the potential role that can be played by traditional institutions 
are likely to fail. The challenge for any new interventions such as introduction of new 
government policies therefore, is how to facilitate sustainable management of resources in the 
constituency and in the region, while retaining this flexible management system which has 
generally enabled a large number of people access to scarce resources. 
<·'(. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
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5. REVIEW OF THE RURAL WATER SUPPLY POLICY AND THE 
NATIONAL LAND POLICY IN NAMIBIA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Following independence of Namibia, the Government of Namibia embarked on a restructuring 
of the public administration (National Planning Commission, 1995). A number of Government 
ministries and departments were restructured within the framework of the new Constitution of 
Namibia. Simultaneously, new policies were formulated which were aimed at meeting the 
challenges of an independent Namibia (National Planning Commission, 1995). The 
independent Namibia was to give priority to the needs of the rural communities who had been 
marginalised by the pre-independence policies (National Planning Commission, 1995). 
Some of the policies which are relevant for this dissertation will be reviewed in this chapter. 
These are mainly, the Rural Water Supply Policy and the National Land Policy. Using the 
Khorixas regional constituency as a case study, this chapter will highlight some of the 
provisions in the Rural Water Supply Policy and the National Land Policy as regards 
management of land and water in communal areas and assess the implications of the policies to 
management of land and water in communal areas. 
5.2 THE RURAL WATER SUPPLY POLICY 
With the restructuring of governmental services after independence, the Government of 
Namibia recognised the need to investigate the water and sanitation sector with the purpose of 
defining overall objectives and policies (Department of Water Affairs, 1993). As Government 
realised that only 50% of the rural population had access to a reliable source of water supply, 
emphasis was given to improving provision of rural water supply (National Planning 
Commission, 1995). 
The Water and Sanitation Policy (WASP) was formulated and approved by Cabinet on 21 
September, 1993 (Department of Water Affairs, 1993). Within the framework of the WASP, 
objectives were identified together with necessary legislative provisions. The Rural Water 
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Supply Policy was thereafter formulated. The Rural Water Supply Policy was accompanied by 
Strategy papers which spelt out mechanisms for implementation of the policy. With the 
adoption of the WASP, the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) was restructured (Department 
of Water Affairs, 1993). The restructured Department of Water Affairs was to concentrate on 
resource management and rural water supply, and the Directorate of Rural Water Supply 
(DRWS) was given the responsibility for rural water supply (Department of Water Affairs, 
1993). A commercially oriented corporation, Namibia Water Corporation Ltd. was to be 
established for provision of bulk water (Department of Water Affairs, 1993). 
The WASP defines the scope and expected services to be rendered within the water and 
sanitation sector. Furthermore, the WASP allocates responsibilities to the different actors and 
beneficiaries to be involved in the implementation of the policy. The specific water supply 
objective of the WASP is to supply water in sufficient quantities of acceptable quality from 
available sources on a sustainable basis, by utilising affordable means to meet the reasonable 
demands of the consumers (Department of Water Affairs, 1993). Water supply for human 
consumption has been given priority over other uses such as water for livestock farming and 
economic activities like mining and industries (Department of Water Affairs, 1993; Dewdney, 
1996). 
The WASP adopted the following guiding principles: 
• 
• 
Essential water supply and sanitation services should become available to all Namibians 
and be accessible at a cost which is affordable to the country as a whole. 
Equitable improvement of services should be achieved by the combined efforts of the 
Government and the beneficiaries based on community involvement and community 
participation. 
• Beneficiaries should contribute towards the cost of the services. 
• Communities should have the right, within the framework of resources available, to 
determine which solutions and service levels are acceptable to them. 
• An enabling environment should be promoted to encourage the involvement and 
participation of both the private sector and support organisations. 
• Environmentally sustainable development and utilisation of the water sources should be 
pursued. 
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• Overall sustainability of the water and sanitation sector will depend on the ability of the 
sector to become self-sufficient, by at least covering running and maintenance costs 
(Department of Water Affairs, 1993). 
Based on the principles of the WASP, the Rural Water Supply Policy was formulated and 
adopted the following guidelines: 
An agreement between the community and government authorities setting out the 
respective responsibilities and commitments with respect to community involvement and 
participation should be a prerequisite for government support. 
Payment by the community should as a general rule cover operation and maintenance 
costs. 
Given the great variations in conditions throughout Namibia, a system should be worked 
out whereby the ability of each community to pay for services rendered can be evaluated 
and the need for subsidisation quantified. 
• Government support should be reconsidered if stipulated conditions of the agreement are 
not complied with (Department of Water Affairs, 1993). 
Taking cogmsance of the shortcomings within the water sector, investigations sought to 
establ ish the most appropriate institutions that could give effective implementation of the 
WASP principles and improvements required in the sector (Department of Water Affairs, 1993). 
Participation of rural communities and local-level or community-based institutions was seen as 
one of most effective ways in which rural water supply could be managed on a sustainable basis 
(Department of Water Affairs, 1993). Communities in the rural areas were therefore to be 
encouraged to participate fully in the planning, construction, operation and management of their 
water supply. 
Locai-level institutions in the form of water committees were to be established at different 
levels country-wide to take overall responsibility of water points, most of which are boreholes 
(MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). Each region would have a Central Water Committee (CWC) 
whose main function would be to stimulate development of rural water supply schemes and to 
co-ordinate activities of different Local Water Committees. Local Water Committees (LWC) 
would be in charge of water points within a defined geographical area and the Water Point 
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Committees (WPC) would be responsible for individual water points (DWA, 1994). Liaison 
between the Directorate of Rural Water Supply regional offices and the different water 
committees would be carried out by the Rural Water Extension Officers (RWEO) of the DRWS. 
A major role of the Rural Water Extension Officers would be to facilitate community 
participation and train water communities. The figure below shows the relationship between the 
DW A and the different structures involved in the management of rural water supply. 
Department of Water Affairs 
Directorate of Rural 
Water Supply 
Regional Rural Water 
Supply Office 





e. . Khorixas re ional office 
Water Point 
Committee 
Figure 5.1: Relationship between the DWA and water management 
structures in the rural areas (Adapted from Department of Water Affairs, 1993) 
One of the major tasks of the Central Water Committees is to decide on the order of priority of 
constructing water points in that region (DWA, 1996a). Local Water Committees are "to co-
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ordinate the activities of the Water Point Committees, and to represent their interests in an 
effective way to the outside world" (DWA, 1994, p.S6/1). Local Water Committees are also 
expected to mobilise communities during the planning, design and construction stages of a 
project and to supervise the Water Point Committees activities after completion of a project. 
Local Water Committees also enter into an agreement with the Directorate of Rural Water 
Supply with regards to financial and technical responsibilities (DWA, 1994). 
In order to ensure financial sustainability of the Rural Water Supply Policy, a cost recovery 
programme for water points is being introduced (Koch, pers. comm., 1997). For. the first five 
years of policy implementation, communities will be required to pay for operation and 
maintenance costs of their water points, and for the next 15 years communities will be expected 
to pay for all costs including capital costs of the main infrastructure for the new and 
rehabilitation of existing water points (DWA, 1996a; Koch, pers. comm., 1997). The aim is that 
ultimately local communities should take full responsibility of their water points while 
Government plays the role of a facilitator (DWA, 1996a). The cost-recovery programme is to 
be implemented from 1 April, 1997 (Koch, pers. comm., 1997; Samupofu, pers. comm., 1997). 
In preparation for the implementation of the Rural Water Supply Policy, the Directorate of Rural 
Water Supply has prepared a 5 Year Training Plan for support of community-based management 
of rural water supply starting from 1 April, 1997 to 31 March, 2002 (DWA, 1996b). The Plan 
includes training of the Rural Water Extension Officers and the Water Point Committees 
together with training of top and middle management staff within the DRWS (DWA, 1996b). 
In the Khorixas constituency however, training of the Water Point Committees and the Rural 
Water extension Officers had started earlier than the scheduled date (Samupofu, pers. comm., 
1997). 
Training of the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas constituency put emphasis on 
community-based operation and maintenance of water points and community-based financial 
management (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). However, community training by the Rural Water 
Extension Officers did not include education on environmental impacts of water points, 
although attempts were being made to co-ordinate provision of water points with the Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(Samupofu, pers. comm., 1997). Generally, including in the Khorixas constituency, the DRWS 
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did not undertake any environmental investigation before drilling of boreholes. Instead, the 
DRWS conducted an 'Engineering Instinct Assessment' which was more of a technical 
feasibility and needs assessment study (Koch: pers. comm., 1997). 
Overall , 5100 Water Point Committees, 120 Local Water Committees and 14 Central Water 
Committees country-wide have to be trained in order for the communities to be able to take over 
responsibility for the operation and management of all water points (DWA, 1996b ). 
The DRWS recognises that the Water Point Committees should be able to control use and 
access to the water points in order to keep out 'outsiders' who do not contribute to the upkeep of 
water points (DWA, 1994). To be able to perform this function, the Water Point Committees 
need to be legally constituted so as to have legal powers to enforce their decisions (Koch, pers. 
comm., 1997). However, the issue of giving legal status to the Water Point Committees had 
been opposed by the Office of the Attorney General on the basis that "over-formal agreements 
will imply mistrust " (DWA, 1994; p. S4/2; Koch, pers. comm., 1997). The advice from the 
Attorney General 's office was that the status of the Water Point Committees should be allowed 
to evolve gradually. Although a new Water Bill was being drafted, there was uncertainty 
whether it would provide for the legal status of the Water Point Committees (Koch, pers. 
comm., 1997). 
5.2.1 THE ROLE OF THE WATER POINT COMMITTEES IN THE KHORIXAS REGIONAL 
CONSTITUENCY 
Establishment of the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas regional constituency started in 
January 1995 (Samupofu, pers. comm., 1997). By 31 January, 1997 there were 114 committees 
in the constituency, while Local Water Committees had not yet been elected. The emphasis in 
the constituency was on establishing the Water Point Committees before election of the Local 
Water Committees (Samupofu, pers. comm., 1997). 
Members of a Water Point Committee were elected by the community that used the water point 
(DWA, 1994). Membership of the Water Point Committees consisted of a Chairman, Secretary, 
Treasurer and a Caretaker. Depending on the size of the community, additional members could 
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be elected (Samupofu, pers. comm., 1997). According to the Rural Water Supply Policy, 
traditional leaders such as chiefs or headmen were not by virtue of their status members of the 
Water Point Committees unless they were elected by their communities (Samupofu, pers. 
comm., 1997). Some members of the community in the constituency were of the view that 
traditional chiefs should be permanent members of the Water Point Committees since they were 
still widely respected by communities and played an important role in land allocation issues and 
resolution of conflicts amongst communities (Samupofu and Muruwoa, pers. comm., 1997). 









educating community members in the proper use of the water point 
creating awareness that community members are responsible for the water point 
providing rules for operation of the water point, and making sure that the rules are obeyed 
appointing and supervising a Caretaker who will be a special member of a Water Point 
Committee responsible for the operation and maintenance of a water point 
reporting repairs which are too difficult for the community to carry out to the respective 
Local Water Committee and the Rural Water Extension Officer 
addressing complaints of misuse and solving problems relating to water points 
keeping records of all income and expenditure, and, 
collecting money to pay for operation and maintenance costs (DWA, 1994) . 
The full terms of reference of the Local Water Committees and the Water Point Committees are 
given in Appendices 1 and 2. 
The views about the role and structure of the Water Point Committees varied amongst different 
members of the communities in the Khorixas constituency. In some cases, local communities 
had only heard of the Water Point Committees but did not understand what their role was 
(MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). 
Generally, the main issues that emerged in various discussions during the field trip with either 
members of the community, community leaders, members of the Water Point Committees and 
some government officers about the new Rural Water Supply Policy included the following: 
• Government did not explain clearly how the cost-recovery policy was to be implemented. 
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• There had not been enough consultation with the people to explain the provisions of the new 
policy and their implications to local communities. Two workshops had been held in the 
region which had been attended by some members of the Water Point Committees. 
• Water Point Committees were not seen as 'meaningful' because in some cases only one 
family used the borehole, or members of the committees were not permanently based in one 
settlement as they had to move to other areas in search of grazing land. 
• The borehole structures were expensive to maintain and communities would not afford to 
maintain them in future when the policy is implemented. 
• Local communities had not been consulted in the siting of boreholes and therefore 
communities could not be expected to assume government's responsibility. Cases were 
cited where boreholes sited by government geohydrologists did not yield sufficient water to 
meet community needs, while boreholes sited by the local diviners were seen to be more 
successful in terms of yielding sufficient water for community needs. The communities felt 
that lack of knowledge on local conditions contributed to the failure of most boreholes (see 
Plate 2). 
• Water Point Committees did not have any legal status and therefore it would be difficult to 
control and enforce rules and regulations on use of the boreholes. It was emphasised that, 
because communities could not exclude 'outsiders' who did not contribute to the upkeep of 
boreholes, management of water supply would be difficult. 
• Management of the boreholes could not be addressed in isolation from land tenure issues in 
the communal areas. As long as there was no clear security of land tenure in the communal 
areas, communities considered that it would be difficult to control use of the boreholes by 
' outsiders ' (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). In December 1996, it was estimated that about 
53% of users of water points in the Kunene region were ' outsiders ' who did not seek 
permission from the resident communities or its leaders (SIAP AC, 1997). 
A ' Wrap-up Workshop ' was held on the 23rd to 26th October, 1996 in Outjo by the DRWS to 
solicit comments from members of the community about the Rural Water Supply Policy in the 
Kunene Region. The following issues and concerns were raised by representatives from the 
different regions, (including the Khorixas regional constituency): 
• Government should go into partnership with communities in order to promote community 
development. 








Government must train all community members in borehole management. 
The activities of Government must be transparent at all times . 
The National Land Policy and security of tenure should be addressed before the cost-
recovery programme is implemented. 
Water points should be in good condition before hand-over to communities . 
Traditional leaders should take a leading role in community development issues . 
Government should consult with traditional leaders and councillors before any development 
activities are implemented. 
Local communities must collect and manage funds themselves (DWA, 1996a) . 
The DRWS Khorixas regional office is required to play a leading role m facilitating 
implementation of the Rural Water Supply Policy in the South Kunene region. However, this 
office was constrained by a number of factors. These included lack of trained personnel, 
financial and material resources. The number of the Rural Water Extension Officers was far 
less than the number required in order to deliver the services to communities efficiently and 
effectively (Samupofu and Carstens, pers. comm., 1997). In February 1997, there were only 11 
available posts for the Rural Water Extension Officers out of the total 21 posts required for the 
regional office to operate efficiently and effectively (Samupofu, pers. comm., 1997). Acute 
shortage of transport to enable the Rural Water Extension Officers to reach all communities was 
also cited as a major constraint. Prior to 1996, the DRWS Khorixas regional office had no input 
into the capital and running costs budget. The capital and running costs budgets for the 
Khorixas regional office and for other regional offices were prepared in Windhoek by senior 
management who were not familiar with the local conditions. Consequently, the regional 
offices operated under very limited financial constraints and could not effectively provide 
expected services to the communities (Samupofu, pers. comm., 1997). 
5.3 THE NATIONAL LAND POLICY 
The distribution and management of land in Namibia is complex and is a result of former 
colonial policies which are inappropriate to Namibia today (Corbett and Daniels, 1996). As far 
back as 1892, the German colonial authority formulated the first land policy which demarcated 
the 'Crown lands' and the 'Native reserves' of South West Africa (Hangula, 1995). Land 
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formerly utilised by indigenous communities was dispossessed and set aside for European 
settlement as 'Crown lands ' , while the original owners were confined to the 'Native reserves ' 
(Corbett and Daniels, 1996). The subsequent Proclamations and Regulations that were passed 
later in the 1960's by the South African Government to redefine 'Native nations ' or 
'Bantustans' sharpened the division between the white and black dominated areas in South West 
Africa (Corbett and Daniels, 1996). As a result there continues to be two distinct property 
regimes that have developed in isolation from each other, the commercial private property 
regimes which formerly belonged to white farmers and the communal state property regimes 
areas which were set aside for the use of black farmers (Hangula, 1995). Commercial farmers 
have the right to fence off their land to ensure minimal disruption to their land and other 
resources. Conversely in communal areas, farmers lack ownership rights of the natural 
resources, and this has been a disincentive to sustainable use and management of resources 
(MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997 citing Jones, 1993). 
Prior to independence, allocation of land in communal areas was regulated by a series of 
traditional authorities or ' second tier authorities ' set up by South African Government (MPhil. 
Baseline Report, 1997 citing Rohde, 1994). The traditional authorities had the powers to 
impose fines or penalties for the misuse or depletion of natural resources, and these control 
measures secured access of people to common resources and reduced resource depletion 
(Hangula, 1995). 
After independence, all laws regulating these authorities were repealed. Communal land, 
together with water points and other natural resources came under control of central government 
(Rohde, 1994). With the State controlling use of all natural resources, traditional authorities 
were left insecure about their role in the newly independent Namibia, and many traditional 
leaders felt their powers had been eroded and were therefore powerless (Hangula, 1995). In 
some communal areas of Namibia, mismanagement of natural resources and land degradation 
originated with the insecurity that some communities felt regarding the status of their traditional 
authorities (Hangula, 1995). Since independence, because state policies have undermined the 
former traditional authorities and management system, and because of ineffective state controls, 
common resources such as water and grazing land are theoretically open and accessible to all 
communal residents (Rohde, 1994). 
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Efforts to redress the land problem in Namibia were initiated immediately after independence 
and were dominated by the Land Conference in 1991 (Harnett, 1993). The Conference 
culminated in a number of recommendations and resolutions. One of the most important 
recommendations was that the land question in Namibia had to be seriously addressed because it 
had a direct impact on government policies relating to the proposed cost-recovery programme 
for water supply, the establishment of wildlife conservancies, resettlement programmes and 
rangeland management (NANGOF, 1996). In January 1997, a Green Paper on the National 
Land Policy and the Communal Land Bill was published by the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation, and will be distributed country-wide for comments from different interest 
groups before a land policy for Namibia can be developed (Tjipueja, pers. comm., 1997). 
5.3.1 PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LAND POLICY WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNAL AREAS 
The draft National Land Policy (Section 18) provides for different forms of 'property rights' 
which will be accorded equal status, security and protection. These are customary grants, state 
ownership, leasehold, licences ( certificates or permits) and freehold (Ministry of Lands, 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation, 1997). Land rights holders for the different 'property rights' 
will be individuals, families constituted as family trusts, duly constituted co-operatives, 
companies and the State (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, 1997). In 
communal areas, all land belongs to the State, however multiple forms of land rights will be 
accorded to rural communities. These are state ownership, leasehold and customary grants 
(Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, 1997). These 'property rights' are 
discussed briefly in this section. 
State ownership 
The draft National Land Policy is based upon principles enunciated in the Constitution of 
Namibia (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, 1997). Article 100 of the 
Constitution of Namibia, states that: "Land, water and natural resources below and above the 
surface of the land .... shall belong to the State if they are not otherwise lawfully owned" 
(Harnett, 1993, p.6). 'Lawful ownership' means freehold title and State title (Ministry of Lands, 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation, 1997). In keeping with this principle, all communal land is 
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under control of the State. In communal areas, the powers of the State will be vested in 
Regional Land Boards which will execute their powers on behalf of the inhabitants 
(Government of Namibia, 1996). There will be one Regional Land Board in each region and 
later Local Land Boards are to be established for each rural constituency. Authority over rights 
which are currently exercised or held by traditional leaders or other customary authorities on 
behalf of communal residents will be transferred to Regional Land Boards. The Constitution 
further provides the right to all Namibians to settle where they choose within the country 
(Corbett and Daniels, 1996). 
Persons designated as traditional leaders in terms of the Traditional Authorities Act may not be 
nominated to serve as members of Land Boards, but Regional Boards may appoint traditional 
authorities designated under Traditional Authorities Act to perform such duties as they may 
specify. Traditional authorities will be expected to assist Land Boards in resolution of disputes 
over land granted under customary law, and will play an advisory role to the State President on 
control and utilisation of communal land through the Council of Traditional Leaders which will 
be established in accordance with the Constitution (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation, 1997). 
Leasehold 
Section 82 of the National Land Policy provides for any person to apply for a lease for a period 
of 30 to 50 years, primarily for business purposes. Such leases can be registrable, inheritable 
and mortgageable. A lease agreement cannot be granted in respect of land which is subject of 
customary right, except where such right is relinquished to the Land Board. 
Customary grants 
Certificates of rights are to be introduced for customary uses such as residential use and 
subsistence farming. The certificate is not transferable, except with the consent of the Regional 
Land Board. Where people were issued with a 'Permission to Occupy' certificate on 
Government land, they will be required to apply to the Land Board of the region for conversion 
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of the title to new forms of tenure since the 'Permission to Occupy' certificates are to be phased 
out. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The Government of Namibia recognises that one of the prerequisites for sustainable 
management of resources such as land and water is putting in place policies which address the 
key constraints facing the resource users. The Rural Water Supply Policy was formulated with 
the aim of improving the conditions of the rural population who had been marginalised by pre-
independence policies. The guiding principles for the policy are embedded on the concepts of 
equity, affordability and overall sustainability. Community involvement and participation is 
also seen as a cornerstone to sustainable management of water resources, particularly in the 
rural areas. Water Point Committees are therefore being established to take responsibility of 
water points in the rural areas in order to manage water resources on a sustainable basis. A 
challeng·e for Namibia will therefore be how to translate this policy into practical and 
sustainable actions. 
The National Land Policy also attempts to redress the land inequalities by improving access to 
land and tenure security for the majority of Namibians living in rural areas. The Land 
Conference in 1991 was a milestone in the history of the country in terms of addressing some of 
the major land problems in the country. A Green Paper on the National Land Policy provides 
for different 'property rights' in order to improve security of tenure for all the citizens of 
Namibia. However, a major consideration is whether the policy guarantees security of tenure of 
the natural resources such as water, land and others, particularly in communal areas. Without 
security of tenure of the resources, efforts for sustainable management of water resources as 
envisaged in the Rural Water Supply Policy will be difficult to achieve. 
:!:(:_ 
CHAPTER SIX 
Local-level Institutions and Common Property Resource Management 
6. TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE LOCAL-LEVEL MANAGEMENT 




The Rural Water Supply Policy and the National Land Policy in Namibia were formulated with 
the view to improve Government's delivery of services to all Namibians. As a departure from 
the pre-independence approach of state management of social services, the Rural Water Supply 
Policy of 1993- promotes community-based management of rural water supply. Water Point 
Committees are being established country-wide to facilitate local-level management of water 
supply in rural areas. The National Land Policy proposes different forms of 'property rights' in 
the rural areas in order to improve access to land and provide security of tenure of land and 
other natural resources, particularly in communal areas. 
This chapter analyses the extent to which the provisions of the Rural Water Supply Policy and 
the National Land Policy will facilitate or hamper effectiveness of Water Point Committees in 
the Khorixas constituency. Socio-economic conditions in the Khorixas constituency and their 
appropriateness for the effective functioning of the Water Point Committees will also be 
analysed. The chapter further considers the four attributes of sustainability and examines the 
extent to which there are adequate and effective mechanisms in place to translate policies into 
practicable and sustainable actions, thereby improving the effectiveness of the Water Point 
Committees. Effectiveness of the Water Point Committees in this context refers to the degree to 
which they are able to perform their tasks and responsibilities as spelled out in the Rural Water 
Supply Policy. 
The conditions which are necessary to support the common property regimes and local-level 
management have been highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3, and have been evaluated in Tables 2.1 
and 3.1. The conditions rated as of high significance have provided the basis for the criteria 
against which this analysis of the Water Point Committees is made. Those conditions that are 
closely related have been put together under one main criterion. Table 6.1 at the end of this 
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chapter provides a framework for analysis of the criteria. More specifically, this analysis 








the National Land Policy and security of tenure of the resource 
the Rural Water Supply Policy and achieving sustainability 
social organisation and social stability of the communities 
water as a resource and incentives to local communities 
new institutional structures as against traditional structures and indigenous management 
systems 
Water Point Committees and genuine devolution and, 
capacity building . 
The criteria which have not been satisfactorily addressed in the implementation of policies will 
form the basis for the actions recommended in Chapter 7. 
6.2 THE NATIONAL LAND POLICY AND SECURITY OF TENURE OF THE 
RESOURCE 
The Rural Water Supply Policy recognises the need for involvement and participation of local 
communities and the Water Point Committees in the management of rural water supply. Central 
government is to play a facilitating role by taking the responsibility for planning and design of 
rural water supply, while the Water Point Committees will be responsible for day-to-day 
management of their water points. Literature experience shows that in order for the Water Point 
Committees in the Khorixas constituency to manage their water resources sustainably, they must 
have secure tenure of the land and water. Without secure tenure, there will be no incentive to 
participate in water management efforts. 
The National Land Policy however, does not guarantee secure tenure of land, water and other 
natural resources, particularly in communal areas like the Khorixas constituency. Under the 
National Land Policy, all natural resources are subject to a state property regime. In principle, 
this means that control on use of natural resources rests with the state rather than with the local 
communities. 
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Although it is not envisaged that the state could prohibit use of land and water resources by 
communities in the Khorixas constituency, state control over these resources does not guarantee 
tenure security to the Water Point Committees and the local communities. Under a state 
property regime, the Water Point Committees have no right in the decision making process that 
determines use or protection of water resources. As long as the control of land and water is 
vested in the state, communities in the Khorixas constituency and other communal areas are not 
guaranteed long-term access to and use of water resources, a key to sustainable water 
management. Without security of tenure of land and water, there will be no incentive for 
communities to manage water resources sustainably. Water Point Committees therefore, will be 
unable to get the commitment of communities in managing and maintaining water points over 
which they have no control. 
While the National Land Policy makes provision for individual leasehold and customary grants 
for other land uses such as residential, commercial and subsistence farming, it does not provide 
an option for community tenure, particularly for water and other natural resources which are 
used communally. In contrast to the misconception that communal tenure results in open 
access, communal tenure is a system in which a defined group or community enjoys rights over 
a specific parcel of land and has rights of access to an area of common land that provides either 
grazing, water or other resources (Cousins, 1993). Communal tenure is a form of tenure that 
has evolved over centuries in the Damaraland region (which includes the Khorixas 
constituency). Communal management of common property resources is familiar to people in 
the Khorixas constituency, and more importantly, its flexibility has allowed a large number of 
people access to scarce resources which are vital to both their survival and their livestock 
(Cousins, 1993; Rohde, 1994). Communal tenure as one of the principal forms of tenure for 
water and other communally used resources would therefore be appropriate for conditions in the 
Khorixas constituency. 
6.3 THE RURAL WATER SUPPLY POLICY AND ACHIEVING 
SUSTAINABILITY 
The term 'sustainability' has been used world-wide and open to a wide range of interpretations, 
and yet without a clear direction of how it is to be achieved (Jacobson et al., 1995; Hill and 
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Bowen, 1997). "The divergence of opinions relating to the term prove that 'sustainability' is so 
broad that a single definition cannot adequately capture all the nuances of the concept" (Hill 
and Bowen, 1997, p. 225). Despite these different definitions and interpretations, sustainability 
in general encompasses four key attributes. These are economic, social, ecological and 
technical sustainability (Hill and Bowen, 1997). 
Namibia's Constitution (Article 95 (1) in line with global trends for achievement of sustainable 
development states that: 
"The State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, 
policies aimed at the following: .. maintenance of ecosystems, .. and utilisation of natural 
resources for the benefit of all Namibians, both present and .future ... "(Glazewski and Tarr, 
1996, p.129). 
It is considered a difficult task for policies to aim at achieving sustainable natural resource 
management (Jacobson et al., 1995). A critical examination of the implementation of the Rural 
Water Supply Policy in the Khorixas constituency indicates that mechanisms have not been put 
in place to ensure that the key attributes of sustainability, mainly, ecological, social, economic 
and technical sustainability are taken into consideration. Without consideration of these 
attributes of sustainability in the implementation of the Rural Water Supply Policy, it will 
therefore be difficult for sustainable water management to be achieved. These attributes of 
sustainability are discussed below: 
Ecological sustainability 
Ecological sustainability implies that natural resources are used within the reproductive carrying 
capacity of the natural system (Jacobson et al., 1995). In the Khorixas constituency where the 
natural environment is very sensitive to any changes in water balance, ecological sustainability 
becomes a critical factor of any resource management strategy. Ecological sustainability of 
water points will require a management strategy that not only accounts for the quantity of water, 
but will predict the sustainable yield of the natural system to maintain the water. The increasing 
human and livestock population in the constituency further exacerbate the sensitivity of the 
natural ecosystem, and increasing pressure on land and water points may lead to irreversible 
environmental degradation (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997) (see Plate 3). 
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While one of the principles of the Rural Water Supply Policy is that water sources should be 
utilised in an environmentally sustainable manner, ecological sustainability of water points did 
not feature as a key consideration in siting of the boreholes nor as a major component of 
community training by RWEOs. Generally, the borehole drilling programme in the Khorixas 
constituency and the rest of the Kunene region was undertaken without any environmental 
impact assessment and no investigations were done at each borehole to determine the potential 
environmental impacts. Communities and some decision makers in the Khorixas constituency 
did not fully understand the environmental implications of over-extraction of water or provision 
of water points in an arid area (MPhil. Baseline Report, 1997). The fact that providing water 
points in an arid area can lower the resilience of the environment to drought which can lead to 
irreversible environmental degradation, was not comprehensible to communities and some 
decision makers in the Khorixas constituency. 
Given the sensitivity of the environment in the Khorixas constituency and similar arid areas in 
Namibia, assessment of the potential environmental impacts of providing water points in the 
Khorixas constituency should be a priority of any water management strategy. In South Africa 
for example, some of the organisations that assist rural communities in increasing access to 
water and sanitation services such as the Mvula Trust require that projects submitted for their 
support be accompanied by a statement on the likely environmental impacts of the project. 
Where the project is likely to have negative effects on the environment, an Environmental 
Impact Assessment is required. This requirement is intended to increase awareness of rural 
communities on activities which are likely to have adverse effects on their environment, and 
encourage appropriate actions to be taken to mitigate any adverse effects of the projects (Rall, 
pers. comm. 1997). 
Social sustainability 
Social sustainability entails the need for a framework that empowers self control over the 
resources (Jacobson et al, 1995). Local communities must have the necessary skills and 
knowledge to meaningfully participate in the operation and maintenance of their systems. 
Social sustainability in natural resource management also seeks to achieve equitable distribution 
in the use of resources, and to avoid excessive consumption of resources (Hill and Bowen, 
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1997). In the context of water management in the Khorixas constituency, social sustainability 
would imply that local communities get the necessary education and training to be able to 
understand that water resources are limited and need to be shared by both present and future 
generations, thereby calling for more sustainable use. However, without necessary education 
and capacity enhancement of local communities on ecological sustainability of water points as 
has been highlighted earlier, social sustainability will be difficult to achieve. 
Economic and technical sustainability 
Economic sustainability in policies for resource management seeks to ensure that the costs of 
resource management are affordable to the resource users and considers how these resources 
will be made available to other users in future (Jacobson et al., 1995). 
Although the cost-recovery programme for operation and maintenance of boreholes under the 
Rural Water Supply Policy was to be implemented from 1 April 1997, affordability by the 
communities in the Khorixas constituency had not been fully addressed. Communities in the 
Khorixas constituency have indicated that borehole infrastructure will be expensive to maintain 
when the cost-recovery programme is implemented. If infrastructure is expensive to maintain, it 
will be economically unsustainable for the communities. If the policy is implemented without 
considering the affordability by communities, there is a likelihood that local communities will 
not be committed to taking over responsibility for maintenance of the boreholes. Moreover, if 
existing boreholes quickly run dry and new water points have to be drilled, local communities 
will incur more costs which will be beyond their financial capability. 
Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Technische Zusammenarbeit (1989) highlights that communities will 
only be willing to take effective responsibility for running their own water supply system, if they 
obta:n a system that they have chosen, can afford and have the resources to sustain it. 
Technology choice must match the community resources available for upkeep of the system. 
When technology is inappropriate or too sophisticated, unaffordable or unmanageable, there will 
be problems of operation, maintenance and rehabilitation. (GTZ, 1989). 
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It can therefore be concluded that if technology for the boreholes in the Khorixas constituency is 
unaffordable and costs of providing water are beyond the financial resources of communities, 
communities will not be committed to taking over responsibility of the boreholes and will not be 
able to sustain maintenance of their water supply system. Without co-operation and 
commitment of local communities, the Water Point Committees cannot fulfil their mandate and 
this will hinder their effectiveness in the management of water resources. 
This analysis of the Rural Water Supply Policy illustrates that implementation of the Policy in 
the Khorixas constituency falls short of adequate mechanisms for achieving sustainability. Lack 
of ne ::essary education and understanding of the vulnerability of the resource base by local 
communities and mismanagement of the natural environment will increase the risks of 
ecological degradation. Unaffordable technology is likely to lead to lack of commitment from 
communities and therefore jeopardise long-term sustainability of the cost-recovery programme 
and the effectiveness of the Water Point Committees. 
6.4 SOCIAL ORGANISATION AND SOCIAL STABILITY OF THE 
COMMUNITIES 
The social organisation of communities in the Khorixas constituency offers great potential for 
the effectiveness of the Water Point Committees. Generally, families have common problems 
in terms of availability of scarce resources such as water and grazing land. The scarcity of these 
vital resources under unpredictable environmental conditions has compelled communities to be 
dependent on one another for their livelihood and survival. 
Despite this inter-dependency, the situation in the constituency is complicated by a number of 
factors . The ' fluidity ' of communities makes it difficult to identify definite users of a water 
point at any particular time. Definition of what comprises a community becomes difficult and 
this has a direct impact on water management. Moreover, the diverse composition of people in 
a settlement at any particular time presents a potential for conflict amongst the water users 
because they have different interests and needs. For example, absentee farmers who have other 
sources of income and do not depend on livestock production as their only source of income 
may not give as much priority to sustainable water management as farmers whose livelihood 
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depends entirely on livestock production. Reliance of some community members on other 
sources of income such as pensions, formal employment in urban areas and other external 
sources of income will probably contribute to lack of interest in intensifying water management 
in the constituency. A similar example in Lesotho was given in Section 2.3.1. Due to the 
reliance of villagers on external sources of income, an elected grazing association committee 
was unable to motivate villagers to participate in a range management programme over a badly 
degraded watershed. Although water is so critical to people's l.ivelihoods in the Khorixas 
constituency, there could be varying levels of commitment amongst community members to 
participate in local-level management efforts, and this will hamper any water management 
strategies. 
Without clearly identifiable community members and common interests amongst community 
members, decisions on water management will vary and conflict of interests will emerge 
reducing the potential for effective functioning of the Water Point Committees. The complexity 
in terms of characteristics of the water users in the Khorixas constituency therefore demands 
more involvement from central government, because the nature of problems such as lack of 
incentives and conflicting interests may be complex for the Water Point Committees to handle 
without any form of higher level institutional support. This issue of incentives is further 
discussed in Section 6.5 below. 
6.5 WATER AS A RESOURCE AND INCENTIVES TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
An assessment of costs and benefits of water management by communities will determine the 
extent to which the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas constituency will be effective. 
Lawry (1990) highlights that where the resource is of little economic value to local people, local 
institutions are unlikely to be effective. In the Khorixas constituency, water is highly variable, 
very scarce and is critical to people's survival, and yet it does not contribute to overall 
household income, particularly in comparison to livestock farming which is the main source of 
income in the constituency. Where water management conflicts with its use for other purposes 
such as livestock, it could be difficult to encourage local communities to improve water 
management because water is not of high economic value to them. Moreover, large herd sizes 
are a sign of social status in the community in the constituency. 
Local-level Institutions and Common Property Resource Management 83 
The effectiveness of the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas constituency will also be 
hampered by the fact that benefits that accrue from water management are not tangible and 
immediately visible to communities, as compared, for example, with benefits that would be 
derived from wildlife management. Furthermore, under the present tenure arrangements, it is 
difficult to exclude anybody from using the water. Therefore, there are no incentives for water 
management because the benefits of management accrue to all community members irrespective 
of whether they participate in water management efforts or not. 
Under this complex setting, it will be necessary for government to play a more active role in the 
local management of water in order to control use of water and possibly develop some 
innovative incentives to encourage community participation in water management. Moreover, 
poor water management in the region can have far reaching environmental consequences, hence 
the need for government ' s involvement. 
6.6 NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES VIS-A-VIS TRADITIONAL 
STRUCTURESANDINDIGENOUSMANAGEMENTSYSTEMS 
In the Khorixas constituency, traditional chiefs and headmen still play a central role in land 
allocation and resolving land disputes. Traditional chiefs and headmen are still influential and 
their authority is recognised as 'legitimate ' amongst communities (MPhil. Baseline Report, 
1997; Muruwoa, pers. comm., 1997). The Rural Water Supply Policy however provides for the 
establishment of elected Water Point Committees excluding the potential role that these 
traditional chiefs and headmen could play in water management. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Traditional Chiefs Council plays an advisory role to the State 
President on land issues, the direct involvement of the traditional chiefs in the Water Point 
Committees could strengthen the effectiveness of these committees. Their practical knowledge 
and experience in resolving community disputes could be an added advantage to the Water 
Point Committees when addressing water management problems in the constituency. Because 
traditional chiefs are closer to individual community members at 'grass-roots' level, they can 
solicit community co-operation (Hangula, 1995). Moreover, communities have requested that 
any attempts to address resource degradation and sustainable use of water has to fully involve 
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traditional leaders in order to gain support and commitment from communities. If the Water 
Point Committees are to be seen as 'legitimate' and are to earn support of the communities they 
should be fully representative of traditional community decision making structures. 
Lack of inv01 •ement of local diviners in the Khorixas constituency during the siting of water 
points contributes to lack of commitment in water management from communities. Although 
indigenous management systems do not necessarily prove successful at all times, it is important 
that these local diviners are involved in the planning of water points. Communities will not be 
committed to government developmental programmes if they feel local knowledge has been 
ignored and they have not been involved in decision making on matters relating to project 
design and implementation (Paul, 1988). 
6.7 WATER POINT COMMITTEES AND GENUINE DEVOLUTION 
The effectiveness of the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas constituency will greatly 
depend on the extent to which they are legally empowered to enforce their decisions. Legal 
recognition of the Water Point Committees will determine what they can do, how they relate to 
other institutions and how they can protect their rights. Reluctance by relevant government 
authorities, specifically the Office of the Attorney General to give the Water Point Committees a 
legal status could frustrate any efforts by the committees to enforce their decisions and therefore 
effectively manage water resources. Korten (1986) and Murphree (1994) argue that when there 
are no legally recognised mechanisms to enforce decisions, even well functioning local 
institutions are likely to fail. A clear and independent legal mandate that commands the respect 
of the state and the communities would likely enhance the effectiveness of the Water Point 
Committees. 
In Namibia, the 'conservancy' concept initiated by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism 
also offers some useful lessons that could be applied to the Water Point Committees. 
Conservancies are legally constituted bodies which have legal rights to use and manage wildlife 
within conservancy boundaries for the benefit of the community. Before a conservancy is 
registered, the Ministry of Environment and Tourism has to be satisfied that a conservancy has a 
geographical definition which is not disputed, a conservancy has a proper constitution which 
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includes a set of rules as to how it will operate, the management committee is representative of 
the community, the committee has the capacity to manage funds adequately and a policy to plan 
for equitable distribution and use of funds ' (Jones, 1995). Legislation supporting people in 
communal areas to gain rights over wildlife through conservancies was passed by Parliament in 
June 1996 (Jones, 1996). This legislation thus enables communities to have legal control over 
wildlife and the accruing benefits. 
Devolution should also include giving decision making powers to the Water Point Committees. 
If the Water Point Committees are expected to take responsibility for the water points, there 
must be willingness to relinquish power from higher level structures such as from the Local 
Water Committees. Such willingness will be demonstrated by enactment of legislation which 
will mandate devolution of decision making powers to the Water Point Committees. Policy 
supporting local-level resource management without appropriate legislation will have very little 
chances of success (Murphree, 1994). Although the Local Water Committees have not yet been 
elected in the Khorixas constituency, under the present organisational arrangements, the Local 
Water Committees for example, represent the Water Point Committees and take some decisions 
on their behalf. 
It is still too early to make any conclusive statements about the working relationship between 
the Water Point Committees and other institutional structures involved in water management in 
the Khorixas constituency. However, it can be emphasised that the Water Point Committees are 
likely to be effective management institutions if they are granted legal decision making powers. 
These include the right to determine rules on the use of water points, powers to exclude 
'outsiders' and to enforce sanctions against breach of the rules. 
6.8 CAPACITY BUILDING 
Although the cost-recovery programme including a training plan to support community-based 
water management was to be implemented from 1 of April, 1997, there was no comprehensive 
training programme developed and executed to ensure capacity-building of the Water Point 
Committees and the local communities in the Khorixas constituency. The emphasis of the 
Water Point Committees training programmes in the Khorixas constituency was on operation 
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and maintenance of boreholes and financial management. While these initiatives are 
acknowledged, it was noted that these training programmes were not really effective in terms of 
building confident and self-sustaining committees. 
Beneficiary capacity building for any development programme should empower beneficiaries by 
strengthening their skills and knowledge so that they can manage their environment (Paul, 
1988). In the Khorixas constituency, in particular, beneficiary capacity building should entail a 
framework which creates empowerment of communities through strengthening their skills and 
knowledge so that use of their land and water resources is not to the detriment of their natural 
environment. Knowledge and understanding of the interface between the human activities and 
the environment in a non-equilibrium environment should be given priority in any community 
capacity building programme. Simultaneously, environmental education should form an 
integral part of training for the Rural Water Extension Officers since they are expected to train 
the Water Point Committees. 
Simultaneously, the capacity of the Khorixas DRWS regional office needs to be strengthened, if 
it is expected to play a leading role in facilitating implementation of the Rural Water Supply 
Policy. Shortage of extension staff and financial resources will constrain implementation of the 
policy in the constituency. Moreover, the centralised financial resource allocation mechanism 
by government seemed to be a significant barrier in achieving desired outcomes. It is probably 
unlikely that strong Water Point Committees will emerge in the constituency if they are not 
supported by a strong government extension service. If the Khorixas DRWS regional office is 
expected to implement the Rural Water Supply Policy effectively, central government must be 
committed to give the regional office enough power to make decisions. The Khorixas DRWS 
regional office should have its own budget and authority to allocate resources. The office 
should decide on the number of staff employed and have power over expenditure. Central 
government must not only pay lip service to decentralisation of its services and giving 
responsibility to local communities while it retains authority over key decision making powers. 
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6.9 CONCLUSION 
The Rural Water Supply Policy in Namibia lays the foundation for local-level management of 
water supply in rural areas in Namibia. In the Khorixas constituency, the Water Point 
Committees are being established to take responsibility for the water points. However, some of 
the provisions of the National Land Policy hamper efforts towards local-level management of 
water. The absence of tenure security for communal farmers in the Khorixas constituency will 
be a major constraint towards sustainable management of water by the Water Point Committees 
and the local communities. 
Lack of involvement of traditional leaders in the Water Point Committees and use of indigenous 
knowledge systems in siting of boreholes by local diviners will likely impact negatively on the 
effectiveness of the Water Point Committees. Local communities are unlikely to be committed 
to water management efforts where they believe they have not taken part in the decision making 
process and local-level management structures are not fully representative of their traditional 
decision-making structures. 
Without genuine devolution, the Water Point Committees cannot become effective management 
institutions. The committees must have the right to determine rules of access to and use of the 
resource, and have legal powers to enforce their decisions. Government must therefore provide 
for enabling legislation that will facilitate devolution of decision making powers to the Water 
Point Committees. 
Water Point Committees and local communities should have an understanding of how their 
actions may contribute to the degradation of their sensitive environment. Community training 
programmes should aim at increasing awareness of local communities on the environmental 
implications of borehole provision in the constituency. It is anticipated that this could enhance 
commitment to sustainable management of water resources. 
The Khorixas DRWS regional office, which is charged with the responsibility for implementing 
the Rural Water Supply Policy must be supported with requisite resources to fulfil its mandate. 
The failure by the Khorixas DRWS regional office to deliver its services efficiently and 
effectively in the constituency will have negative consequences on the effectiveness of the 
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Water Point Committees and generally on the successful implementation of the Rural Water 
Supply Policy in the Khorixas constituency. 
Ultimately the success of the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas constituency will 
depend on the extent to which there are mechanisms in place to ensure that implementation 
of the Rural Water Supply Policy takes cognisance of the principles of sustainability. 
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Table 6.1: Framework for assessment of the criteria for the effective functioning 
Water Point Committees in the Khorixas constituency 
Criteria 
Security of tenure 
Achieving sustainability 
Social organisation 
and social stability 
Water as a resource and 
incentives to communities 
New institutional 
structures vis-a' -vis 
traditional structures and 
indigenous management 
systems 
Water Point Committees 
and genuine devolution 
Capacity building 
Conditions Comments 
-Clearly defined Not satisfactorily 
boundaries of the resource addressed 
and of the resource users 
-Ecological sustainability 
-Social sustainability 
-Economic and technical 
sustainability 
-Homogeneity of resource 
users 
-Resource users are well 
defined 
-Assessment of costs and 
benefits 
-Variability of the resource 




-Different institutions to 
be co-ordinated 
-Government legislation 
-Clearly specified rules and 
guidelines 












knowledge of resource users addressed 
-Adequate resources to 





7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation has illustrated that local-level institutions are an appropriate institution for 
sustainable management of common property resources, provided they are supported by 
effective policies, have capacity and resources and there are adequate mechanisms and 
appropriate institutional arrangements that support local-level management. Water Point 
Committees which are being established in the Khorixas constituency therefore, can become 
a vehicle for promoting sustainable water management in the constituency given an enabling 
environment. However, the lack of: security of tenure of the natural resources; decision 
making powers by the Water Point Committees; capacity; involvement of traditional leaders 
and use of indigenous management systems and consideration of sustainability attributes in 
the implementation of policies at the local level could hamper the effectiveness of the Water 
Point Committees and efforts for sustainable management of water supply in the Khorixas 
constituency. 
This chapter draws some conclusions from the analysis in Chapter 6 and makes broad 
recommendations that could improve the effectiveness of the Water Point Committees in the 
Khorixas constituency. The recommendations include: re-introducing a common property 
regime; developing co-management arrangements between the Water Point Committees and 
other institutions; working with and strengthening traditional institutions and management 
systems; building institutional capacity; using appropriate technology; defining the 
communities and undertaking environmental assessments for all water provision 
programmes in the Khorix~s constituency. These recommendations and their advantages are 
I 
I 
summarised in Table 7.1 at the end of this chapter. 
7.2 RE-INTRODUCI~ G A COMMON PROPERTY REGIME 
Common property managdment regimes are a viable system for managing water resources in 
the Khorixas constituency and therefore should be re-introduced. 
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
The communal system of resource management in the Khorixas constituency has broken 
I 
down as a result of fundamental changes in state policies which have undermined the ability 
! 
of local-level institutions ~o assert control over all resource users or regulate the actions of 
I 
the water users. However,!the state is failing to provide effective control, and resources such 
as water and land which were once common property are increasingly becoming accessible 
to all, with resultant resource degradation. While reverting to a common property regime 
might be difficult under the current changing socio-economic conditions in the constituency 
such as increasing population, it appears from this study that communal water management 
in the Khorixas constituendy has advantages over other resource regimes. 
! 
Communal management of water would possibly allow equitable use of the resources and 
provide a 'safety net' for the poor sections of the community who would otherwise be 
marginalised under any other form of resource management. Through communal 
management, community groups can enter into agreements with one another to negotiate 
access to resources such as grazing and water in a situation where one group has a surplus 
and the other a resource deficit. The scarcity of water resources in the Khorixas constituency 
demands that they be used communally, and therefore communal management becomes the 
most appropriate management option. 
Implementation of a common property regime would restore control over resources which 
are currently open access due to ineffective state control. The National Land Policy should 
therefore provide the option of communal tenure in communal areas in order to improve 
security of tenure of land and water resources. 
7.3 DEVELOPING CO-MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE 
WATER POINT COMMITTEES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
The complex and changing socio-economic conditions in the Khorixas constituency demand 
innovative management arrangements between the Water Point Committees, the state and 
other institutions. 
Strengths and weaknesses of local-level water management should be recognised and new 
forms of partnerships established between the Water Point Committees and the state. 
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However, such partnership arrangements should provide an enabling, facilitative and back 
up role for the state rather than one which replaces or undermines local institutional capacity. 
For instance, government could help create conditions conducive to effective functioning of 
the Water Point Committees by ass.sting with enforcement of rules which have broad 
support in the community, especiall where the Water Point Committees do not have 
authority to control 'free riding' and where conflict exists amongst water users. It may also 
be appropriate for government to work with traditional leaders, particularly for rule 
enforcement and conflict management, drawing from the practical experience of traditional 
leaders. Government should also assist with developing incentives that will enhance water 
management since the success of local-level management is likely to be higher when local 
communities can see tangible and immediate benefits. 
Water Point Committees in this partnership also need enabling legislation and good 
extension service from government. Water Point Committees must have legal powers to 
decide how the water is to be used and their decisions must be legally binding to the resource 
users. Without a clear legal mandate, even well functioning Water Point Committees are 
likely to fail in implementing their decisions. Legislation mandating devolution of decision 
making powers to the Water Point Committees must therefore be enacted so as to empower 
committees to have legally recognised decision making powers. 
7.4 WORKING WITH AND STRENGTHENING l'RADITIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Traditional chiefs and leaders in the Khorixas constituency are recognised as 'legitimate' and 
representative of community decision making structures and therefore should take a leading 
role in community development initiatives such as local-level water management. 
Government efforts to develop local institutional capabilities should take cognisance of 
traditional institutions and should work co-operatively with them. The first preference 
would be to work with traditional institutions unless they are wholly discredited in the eyes 
of the local people. It is important that these traditional institutions be carefully involved 
from the outset of any development initiative since their exclusion could jeopardise the 
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legitimacy and final implementation of a development programme such as the cost-recovery 
programme of rural water supply. In this regard, it may be desirable for traditional chiefs to 
become ex-officio members of the Water Point Committees so that they are fully involved 
and can solicit commitment for participation from their communities. Indigenous 
knowledge systems, such as use of local diviners in siting of water points should be utilised 
and combined with scientific technical expertise where possible in order to build trust and 
commitment for taking responsibility for water management amongst communities. 
7.5 BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
Lack of institutional capacity will retard the effectiveness of Water Point Committees in the 
Khorixas constituency. An effective institutional capacity building programme in the 
constituency is necessary to change attitudes of members of the community and to 
precipitate appropriate action at all levels. 
The key objective of training the Water Point Committees should be to develop more self-
confident and self-sustaining local institutions. In particular, capacity building for the Water 
Point Committees in the Khorixas constituency should involve increasing awareness and 
understanding of the environmental implications of human activities such as the provision of 
boreholes as well as over-utilisation of water resources in the region. Simultaneously, the 
Rural Water Extension Officers should have an increased knowledge base of the regions 
natural environment and the implications of human malpractices. An effective approach to 
capacity building and institutional development could seek to disseminate information 
widely. This could mean that the Water Point Committees are given intensive training, and 
they in turn build capacity of the broader community through training workshops. Such 
training would have long-lasting effects and will empower members of the community to 
meaningfully participate in water management efforts. 
The Khorixas DRWS regional office must have the capacity in terms of human, financial 
and material resources in order to function efficiently and effectively. Central government 
must be committed to relinquish power to the regional office to make decisions on the 
budget, staff appointments and expenditures. 
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Capacity building could also be enhanced by fostering horizontal linkages between the 
different Water Point Committees within and outside Namibia so as provide for exchange of 
experiences. Such exchange programmes could provide relevant information for decision 
makers who have the responsibility to make the Water Point Committees effective. 
7.6 USING APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY 
Communities in the Khorixas constituency have indicated that they cannot afford the costs of 
maintaining the borehole structures and therefore the long-term sustainability of the cost-
recovery programme will be adversely affected. The effectiveness of the Water Point 
Committees in facilitating community participation and sustainable management of water 
supply in the Khorixas constituency will in tum be hampered by the inability of the 
communities to maintain their borehole infrastructure. 
The type of borehole infrastructure utilised must match community affordability levels. 
There is need for further research on the most appropriate borehole technology to be used 
before communities in the Khorixas constituency can take over the responsibility of 
maintenance of boreholes. Appropriate technology in this regard should take cognisance of 
the affordability of maintenance costs which must be borne by local communities. Given the 
economic characteristics of communities in the Khorixas constituency, Government may 
have to consider subsidising the communities even when the cost-recovery programme is 
implemented. 
7.7 DEFINING THE COMMUNITIES 
Communities in the Khorixas constituency are not homogeneous and stable in one place. 
Defining who are members of the community is therefore critical for the success of water 
management strategies and therefore to the effectiveness of the Water Point Committees. 
It would be important to identify the 'legitimate ' members of a water point managmg 
community. Definition of who uses the water points is critical for enforcement of rules and 
for any benefits that may accrue from water management. Local communities with the 
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assistance of government should formulate regulations on who is entitled to use the water 
points as well as methods of access. A compromise might be to follow the approach used in 
Zimbabwe whereby a citizen is free to live anywhere, but is not free to use local community 
resources until he/she has met locally determined requirements such as acceptable length of 
residence, demonstrated environmentally responsible behaviour and participated in local 
institutions. This implies a clear distinction between residence rights and resource use rights 
(Fuller and Turner, 1996). Another strategy could be to introduce the 'user pays ' principle 
whereby 'outsiders' pay for use of water, and the cost would be dependent on the size of the 
family and the number of livestock. 
7.8 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR RURAL WATER PROVISION 
PROGRAMMES 
The long-term sustainability and success in the implementation of the Rural Water Supply 
Policy will largely depend on the extent to which the sustainability criteria have been 
considered in the implementation of rural water supply programmes. 
Future borehole provision programmes in the constituency should evaluate the likely 
environmental consequences that are likely to occur as a result of the programmes. Thus, 
Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA) should be used as a decision-aiding tool in future 
borehole provision programmes. By introducing SEA at a programme level, significant 
environmental impacts of water provision programmes could be identified before the 
projects are implemented, and cumulative and large-scale effects could be predicted at an 
early stage, serving as an ' early warning system' to all relevant parties. Where provision of 
water points is likely to have adverse effects on the environment, an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) should be undertaken. Environmental impacts should be considered 
holistically, thus including ecological, social and cultural, economic and technological 
impacts. 
This dissertation has demonstrated that that local-level institutions, under the 'right' 
conditions and given an enabling environment, could be some of the appropriate and 
effective institutions for management of certain resources. The dissertation has further 
highlighted that the ' common property regimes ' under certain conditions can act as 
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powerful catalysts for development of local-level institutions and community participation 
in resource management. The success of the 'common property regimes' and local-level 
institutions in resource management is however dependent on the appropriateness of the 
socio-cultural conditions and availability of economic and legislative measures that will be 
conducive for local-level management. These conditions and measures include: social 
stability of communities; recognition and strengthening of existing institutional structures 
and utilisation of indigenous management systems where possible; strengthening the 
capacity of the relevant management structures and the resource users; devolution of 
decision making powers to resource users; clearly defined rules and regulations on the use 
of the resource and assessment of benefits to be derived from resource management. The 
effectiveness of local-level institutions will also depend on the extent to which the 
attributes of sustainability will be taken into consideration in the implementation of 
policies. Policy changes that introduce new local-level management institutions without 
taking cognisance of these conditions and measures may likely fail to achieve desired 
results. 
While this dissertation has focused on the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas 
regional constituency, the findings of this study su gest that they can have broader 
application in other areas in Namibia. Thus, while tran ferring responsibility to local-level 
institutions is necessary, and is the key to enhancing t e sustainability of water supply in 
the Khorixas constituency, creating effective Water Poi t Committees country-wide will be 
a major challenge for the Government of Namibia. A variety of measures need to be put in 
place in the short and long-term taking cognisance of prevailing local conditions to ensure 
that policies supporting local-level water management are translated into practical and 
sustainable actions. 
Local-level Institutions and Common Property Resource Management 97 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-=--~~~~~~~~~~~-
Table 7.1: Summary of the recommendations that could improve the effectiveness of 
the Water Point Committees in the Khorixas constituency 
Recommendations Advantages 
Re-introducing a common property -Can be co-ordinated with other regimes. 
regime ··Provides equitable use of resources. 
-Provides a 'safety net for poor sections of 
the community. 
-Communities can enter into exchange 
agreements. 
-Water has to be used communally, and 
therefore a common property regime is the 
most appropriate management option. 
-Would restore control where there is open 
access. 
Developing co-management arrangements -Utilises strengths of different institutions 
to address complex issues. 
-Strengthens capacity of Water Point 
Committees. 
-Traditional institutions have an opportunity 
to be directly involved. 
-Government can assist by developing 
incentives and enabling legislation. 
' 
-Greater chances of rule enforcement and 
control of 'free riding.' 
Working with and strengthening -Their experience can be utilised. 
traditional institutions and management -They are regarded as 'legitimate' by local 
systems communities and therefore earn community 
respect and trust. 
, -Understand local conditions and problems. 
-Are closer to local communities and can 
f 
solicit community commitment to 
development initiatives. 
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Cont. Table 7.1 
Building institutional capacity -Would increase awareness and 
understanding of the natural environment 
amongst communities. 
-Members of the community would have 
necessary skills and knowledge in 
management of their environment. 
-Would enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness of relevant institutional 
structures involved in water management. 
-Confident and self-sustaining local 
institutions likely to develop. 
Using appropriate technology ' -Would ensure long-term sustainability of 
the cost-recovery programme. 
-Communities likely to be willing to take 
over the responsibility for maintenance of 
boreholes. 
Defining the communities -Would facilitate rule enforcement. 
-Benefits of environmental management 
would accrue to the appropriate people. 
I 
-Payment for water would be in accordance 
I 
to the level of consumption. 
Environmental Assessment for rural water -Would increase environmental awareness 
provision programmes on implications of human malpractices on 
the environment. 
-Negative environmental impacts would be 
,. determined at an early stage and appropriate 
actions taken. 
-Would ensure long-term sustainability and 
success in the implementation of the Rural 
Water Supply Policy. 
< ;, t . 
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Plate 2: A borehole sited by government geohydrologists has been abandoned because it 
does not yield sufficient water to meet community needs 
Plate 3: Increasing pressure on land may exacerbate the sensitivity of the natural 
ecosystem and may lead to irreversible environmental degradation 
._ _______ ...::..__ _ __:___---
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APPENDIX! 
GUIDELINES FOR THE TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LOCAL 
WATER COMMIITEES (DEPARTMENT OF WATER AFFAIRS, 1994) 
The Local Water Committee is a body representing the community of a particular area. 
The Local Water Committee will be expected to: 
• assist the government or its representative with the planning and implementation of the 
scheme 
• carry out negotiations to obtain all rights of way needed for the proposed scheme and to 
see that these rights are respected 
• organise the necessary labour and or materials for the construction of the scheme 
• assume operations and management tasks of the scheme after official handing over 
• appoint and supervise one or more scheme caretakers who will supervise the scheme 
operation, maintenance and repairs 
• arrange for and supervise all major repairs that are too difficult for the water point 
caretakers 
• ensure that all members of the community have access to the available water 
• collect money from Water Point Committees and to pay for the operation and 
maintenance costs and keep records of all income and expenditures 
• enter into an agreement with the Department of Water Affairs about the costs and 
supply of services 
• set water tariffs for the end user so that operation and maintenance costs of the scheme 
are covered; tariff structure will be made according to national policies 
• provide the scheme caretakers with the funds for operation and maintenance 
• hold regular meetings and keep records of the meetings 
• guide and monitor the activities of Water Point Committees 
• invite a representative of the Water Point Committees 
• monitor and prepare standard reports about the activities of the scheme caretakers, the 
local water committee and the use of the water scheme 
• submit monitoring reports to the Central Water Committee and the Rural Water 
Extension Officer and, 
• attend the Central Water Committee meetings . 
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APPENDIX2 
GUIDELINES FOR THE TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE WATER 
POINT COMMITTEES (DEPARTMENT OF WATER AFFAIRS, 1994) 
The Water Point Committee is a body representing the community. It is elected by the 
community which uses the water point. The aim of the committee is to: 
• assist the Local Water Committee during the planning, design and construction of the 
project with the manpower, materials, choosing the location of water points and many 
other jobs that have to be done 
• keep the water point in good shape and clean 
• create awareness that the community members are responsible for the water point 
• provide rules for operation of the water point if needed, and to make sure that the rules 
are obeyed 
• address complaints or misuse of water points and solve these problems in a peaceful 
way 
• ensure that all members of the community have access to the available water 
• collect money to pay for operation and maintenance costs 
• keep records of all income and expenditures 
• appoint and supervise a caretaker who will be a special member of the Water Point 
Committee and who will carry out the operation and maintenance of the water point 
• support the caretaker in his or her work 
• hold regular meetings 
• report repairs which are too difficult for the community to carry out to the Local Water 





report to the community on the monthly meetings of Water Point Committees 
collect the log books of the caretaker 
prepare Water Point Committees Meeting report, including the Treasure's Account 
Book and submit it to the Local Water Point Committee and the Rural Water Extension 
Officer and, 
send a delegate to Local Water Committee meetings . 
Local-level Institutions and Common Property Resource Management 







If the condition is not met, there will be fewer 
or no chances of success or effectiveness in 
resource management 
Success in resource management can be 
achieved even if the condition is not met. 
Usually, success or effectiveness also depends 
on other factors being met 
It is an insignificant condition in determining 
the success or effectiveness in resource 
management 
